Dorothy Littrell, et al, Brian M. Barnard v. Cindi Mansell, Odgen City Recorder; Gary Williams, Odgen City Attorney and Matthew Godfrey : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Dorothy Littrell, et al, Brian M. Barnard v. Cindi
Mansell, Odgen City Recorder; Gary Williams,
Odgen City Attorney and Matthew Godfrey : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stanley J. Preston; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for City Defendants/Appellees.
Brian M. Barnard; Utah Legal Clinic; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Littrell v. Mansell, No. 20080752 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1148
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DOROTHY LITTRELL, ei al, 
Plaintiffs, 
BRI| F OF APPELLANT 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CIND1 MAN SELL, Ogden City Recorder; 
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney & 
MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case! No. 20080752 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE | OF UTAH, 
AWARDING SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The Hon. Parley Baldwin, Judge Presiding 
(Trial Court Case No. 0709057^2) 
STANLEY J. PRESTON USB #4119 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for City Defendants / Appellees 
10 Exchange Place 11th Fir 
P.O. Box 45000 




214 East Fifth 
Salt Lake C 
Telephone: 




ity, Utah 84111-3204 
(801)328-9531 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DOROTHY LITTRELL, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; 
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney & 
MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Case No. 20080752 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE. OF UTAH, 
AWARDING SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The Hon. Parley Baldwin, Judge Presiding 
(Trial Court Case No. 0709057^2) 
BRIAN M 
STANLEY J. PRESTON USB # 4119 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for City Defendants / Appellees 
10 Exchange Place 11th Fir 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
BARNARD USB #0215 
UTAH LE<pAL CLINIC 
Attorney ft}r Appellant 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3204 
Telephone: (801)328-9531 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities v 
Statement Re: Parties Plaintiff x 
Prior or Related Appeals xi 
Brief of Appellant i 1 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Issues Presented for Review 2 
Issues Raised and Considered 3 
Standard of Review 3 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) 3 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4 
Statement of the Case 5 
Statement of Facts 8 
Procedural History 8 
Relevant Provisions of Ogden City Code 10 
Application of Disclosure Requirements 12 
Plaintiffs' Goals, Purposes and Good Faith 13 
Summary of Argument 18 
i 
19 
I. Procedural Requirements of Rule 11 20 
Cases Cited by Trial Court Re: Disregard of Rule 11 Procedures 23 
II. Procedural Requirements of Rule 11 Not Followed 25 
a. October 11, 2007 Warning Letter was Not Required Motion 26 
b. Required Twenty-one (21) Days Safe Harbor 26 
c. Rule 11 Motion Filed after the Case is Dismissed 28 
III. No Facts Support Finding a Violation of Rule 11 28 
IV. The Trial Court Made Insufficient Findings to Support Attorney Fee 
Awards 30 
A. Findings as per Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 31 
B. Findings as per Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 
(1953 as amended) 33 
V. Plaintiffs Penalized for Seeking Declaratory Relief 38 
VI. Plaintiffs Not Allowed to Respond to the Attorneys Fee Motion 39 
VII. Plaintiffs' Arguments Are Not Frivolous 40 
VIII. Plaintiffs Brought Suit in Good Faith 41 
A. The City Attorney's legal opinion does not constitute a legal 
finding and is not determinative of plaintiffs' good faith 41 
B. Plaintiffs could not file suit regarding other candidates 42 
C. The timing of the suit was necessitated by the Ogden City Code . . . 42 
D. No facts establish "lack of merit" nor "bad faith" in this action . . . . 43 
ii 
I) I .ack of Merit 43 
ii) Bad< A:. . . 44 
iii) "Lack of Mcrif cind "liac i aiiii are Distinct and Sepamk: 
Elements 45 
. .:..n . . 48 
Relief ^ 
Certificate of Mailing . . 51 
Addendum 52 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Attorney Fees-Award Where Action or Defense in 
Bad Faith-Exceptions (Formerly § 78-27-56) i i 
Rule 1 l(b)-(c). Signing of Pleadings, Motions, Affidavits, and Other Papers; 
Representations to Court; Sanctions ii 
Excerpts from Transcript of Hearing of ( K:\ , • • J: . ; \ i»; . 
Before the Hon. Parley Baldwin, Judge 
Transcript, R. 802 et seq , iv 
Attachments , , 53 
"A": Memorandum Decision Awardmg Fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2 /'-5(» 
(1953 as amended). R 619-623. 
"B": Order AwardiK.'. i W-J> . :,v'jr 1': r>\' V' ' ~v-2~-c«': • • L^? :\\ :nienacuj. 
R. 658-666. 
"C": Memorandum Decision Awarding Fees under Rule 11, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. R. 
748-754. 
"D": Order Awarding Fees under 1 ^c . ••, - \.i .Mv.Pro. ^ ~(>~-
"E": Electronic Court Docket, 2' ! P : >;: ic: r?Av: 
m 
"F": Notice of Hearing. R. 92. 
"G": Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Expedite. R. 283. 
"H": Notice Re: Fee Opposition to be Filed. R. 286. 
"I": Warning Letter from Counsel for City Defendants. R. 648. 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Page 
AeroTech. Inc. v. Estes. 110 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) 27 
Barber v.Miller. 146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998) 21, 28 
Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 932 (Utah 1992) 5, 20, 29, 30 
Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) 4 
Bover v. Bover. 2008 UT App 138 44 
Brickwood Contractors. Inc. v. Datanet Eng.. Inc.. 369 F.3d B85 
(4th Cir. 2004) 21, 22, 27 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants. Inc.. 2007 UT 17 40 
Buckner v. Kennard. 2004 UT 78 42 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham. 2008 UT App 2(07 3, 45 
Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) 6, 30, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 
Carruthers v. Flaum. 450 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 21 
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82 40 
Chipman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997) 19, 46, 47 
Elliott v. Tilton. 64 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995) 27, 29 
Gal v. Viacom Int'l. Inc.. 403 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 21 
Gallegos v. Lloyd. 2008 UT App 40 4, 30, 31, 34, 46, 47 
Gillett v.„P_rjcer 2006 UT 24 40 
v 
Gordon v. Unifund CCR Partners. 345 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2003) 23, 27 
Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78 30, 33 
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp.. 48 F.3d 1320 (2nd Cir. 1995) 27 
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.. 787 P.2d 1 (Ut. App. 1990) 4 
Hess v. Johnston. 2007 UT App 213 29 
Hopkins v. Hales. 2008 UT App 95 4 
Hutchinson v. Pfeil. 208 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2000) 28 
Industrial Commission v. Dalv Mining Co.. 172 P. 301 (Utah 1918) 41 
In re: Jack E. Pratt. Jr.. Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 580 
(5th Cir. 2008) 22, 23, 25 
In re: Olympus Const. LC. 2007 UT App 361 43 
In re: Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3 6, 30, 34, 45, 46 
Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) 4 
Kaiserman Associates. Inc. v. Francis Town. 977 P.2d 462 (Utah 1998) 20 
K.F.K. v. T.W.. 2005 UT App 85 4 
MacFarlane v. State Tax Comm'n. 2006 UT 25 5 
Methode Electronics. Inc. v. Adam Technologies. Inc.. 371 F.3d 923 
(7th Cir. 2004) 23, 24 
Morse v. Packer. 2000 UT 86 4, 20 
Morse v. Packer. 1999 UT 5 5 
Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County. 333 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2003) 24 
vi 
Pangea Techs.. Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40 39 
Parker v. Rampton, 497 P.2d 848 (Utah 1977) 38 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998) 3, 5, 44, 46 
Peterson v. South Salt Lake City. 987 P.2d 57 (Utah 1999) 41 
Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001) 21, 23, 27 
Raile Family Trust ex rel. Raile v. Promax Dev. Corp.. 2001 UT 40 45 
Ridder v. City of Springfield. 109 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 1997) 21, 27, 28 
Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 109 47 
Roth v. Green. 466 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) 22, 24, 27 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977) 38 
State ex rel. E.H.. 880 P.2d 11 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) 41 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 30 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 4 
Still Standing Stable. LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46 6, 7, 31, 34, 44, 45, 46, 47 
Thomas v. Color Country Management. 2004 UT 12 , 41 
United States v. U.S. Gvpsum Co.. 333 U.S. 364 (1948) 4 
Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) 44, 46 
Wardlev Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon. 2002 UT 99 19, 45, 47 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cpattle Co.. 
744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) L 4 
Whitmore v. Murray City. 154 P.2d 748 (Utah 1944) 38 
vii 
Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997) 33 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV, § 1, U.S. Constitution 39 
Article I, § 7, Utah Constitution 39 
LOCAL AND STATE PROVISIONS 
Ogden City Municipal Code § 1-8-1 10, 12 
Ogden City Municipal Code § 1-8-2 10 
Ogden City Municipal Code § 1-8-4 11 
Ogden City Municipal Code § 1-8-5 11, 12, 13, 42 
Ogden City Municipal Code § 1-8-6 11,15 
Ut. Code Ann. § 72-2-3 (1953 as amended) 1 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as amended) 1 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) passim 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953 as amended) 38 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953 as amended) 38 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-33-12 (1953 as amended) 39 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008) 3 
vni 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9011 25 
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 7 8, 9, 39 
Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 11 passim 
SECONDARY AUTHORITY 
5 A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1337.2 (3d ed. 2004) , 22 
IX 
STATEMENT RE: PARTIES PLAINTIFF 
Sixty-two (62) individuals brought this action as plaintiffs: Dorothy E. Littrell; 
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Rodriguez; Saul R. Aguilar; Milton Rodriguez; Rebecca P. Hernandez; Melinda 
Fernandez Nix; Ramon Aguilar; Vivian M. Clay; Sherry Gallegos; Eddie J. Gallegos; 
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Amanda Kilgore; Nanci Byers; Brook Larsen; Katie Spendlove; Jason Rusch; David L. 
Rusch; Cynthia Rusch; Laneil Larsen; Lavere W. Rawlins; F. Craig Hazen; Keith Tisher; 
Robert H. Cato; Thomas I. Dolph; Lillian Medina; Art Fraga; Dina Fraga; Dawn Fraga; 
Pedro Hernandez; Sr.; John Hernandez; Jackie Watkins; Herlinda Hernandez; Phillip 
Fernandez; Felicia Fernandez; Linda Fraga; Zack B. Blairo; and, Ronnie Hales. R. 1-44. 
Four (4) plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims prior to the October 23, 2007 
hearing. Those were Don K. Wilson, Brook Larsen, Laneil Larsen, and, Robert H. Cato 
R. 88; 90; 211. 
These sixty-two (62) plaintiffs are not parties to this appeal. 
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There are no prior or related appeals. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DOROTHY LITTRELL, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; 
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and, 
MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20080752 
APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through counsel, the Utah Legal 
Clinic submits the following BRIEF OF APPELLANT: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as 
amended). The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended). 
The Rule 11 sanctions judgment and order (R. 763), tne subject matter of this 
appeal, was entered on July 29, 2008. The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 19, 
2008. R. 778. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE PROCEDURES OF THAT RULE? 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FACTUAL AND 
LEGAL BASIS? 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. WITHOUT ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACTS? 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
RULE 11, UT.R.CIV.PRO. BASED ON ITS PREVIOUS ERRONEOUS 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended)? 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) WITHOUT 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION? 
DID THE COURT PROPERLY AWARD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE FACTS TO 
SUPPORT THE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS? 
2 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
The issues on appeal were raised in three (3) motions and supporting memo-
randums, to wit: Motion to Dismiss (R.l 13-116; 120-156), Motion for Attorney fees 
under Ut. Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1953 as amended) (R. 117-156) and Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions. R. 631-651. Plaintiffs' and appellant's response memorandums countered the 
several motions of the defendants. R. 232; 283; 286; 473; 559; 673. Defendants' 
motions were considered and resolved in the Court's Memorandum Decisions (R. 619-
623; 748-754) and Orders. R. 658-666; 763-770. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amendedV 
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 7$-27-56 (1953 as amended), 
against a party whose action is without merit and is brought in bad faith is reviewed on 
appeal as a mixed question of fact and law: "As to whether the party lacked good faith, 
the trial court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. In addition, the 
trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without merit." Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, f 11, 186 P.3d 1012 quoting 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). 
The trial court's determination that [a] claim was filed in bad faith is a 
question of fact that we review under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
1
 The statute has been re-numbered; it is now Ut. Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008). 
A copy of the statute is attached to this brief. 
3 
Hopkins v. Hales. 2008 UT App 95, ^  7, 185 P.3d 402 citing Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 
202, 204 (Ut. Ct.App.1991); Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, lj 6, 178 P.3d 922. 
"
CA finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.'" State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 
(auotinz United States v. U.S. Gvpsum Co.. 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948)). 
"A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are not given 
special deference." Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.. 787 P.2d 1, 2 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); Western Kane County Special 
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987)). 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure2 
Appellate review of sanctions under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires different standards depending on the issue considered: 
• the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard; 
• the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 11 was violated and any 
subsidiary legal conclusions are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard; and, 
the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanctions to be 
imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
K.F.K. v. T.W.. 2005 UT App 85, f 4; 110 P.3d 162; Morse v. Packer. 2000 UT 86, If 16, 
2
 A copy of the pertinent portions of Rule 11 is attached to this brief. 
4 
15 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Utah 2000) citing Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, If 10; 973 P.2d 422 
(citing Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992)); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. 
Co.. 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). 
Interpretation of and compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 are 
reviewed as a matter of law under a correction of error standard. See MacFarlane v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 2006 UT 25, f 9, 134 P.3d 1116. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASK 
Sixty-two (62) Ogden City voters brought suit under the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act seeking construction and, if appropriate, enforcement of certain Ogden 
City Ordinances regarding elections. Suit was filed a month before the November 2007 
municipal election and dealt with personal campaign committees, the vehicles through 
which all city election campaigns must be conducted. Appellant Brian M. Barnard 
("Barnard") represented plaintiffs in that action. 
Defendants were the City Attorney and City Recorder (the "City Defendants") and 
the incumbent Mayor, who was then a mayoral candidate. The suit complained that the 
Mayor had failed to properly register his personal campaign committee and had failed to 
file required financial reports for that committee. 
Plaintiffs sought equitable relief. R. 1-44. Plaintiffs were granted declaratory 
relief- the trial Court reviewed and interpreted certain Ogden election code ordinances. 
R. 619-623; 658-666. Plaintiffs were denied injunctive relief- the trial Court's 
interpretation of the ordinances differed from plaintiffs' proposed interpretation. Id. 
5 
The plaintiffs take an active interest in Ogden municipal government and speak out 
on matters of concern to city residents. R. 322-470. Plaintiffs brought suit in good faith, 
motivated by a sincere belief that defendant Matthew Godfrey had failed to comply with 
Ogden City election code requirements and that two (2) members of Godfrey's city 
administration had failed to take appropriate action to secure compliance. Id. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. R. 113-116; 120-156. Before the 
trial court's determination as to any substantive claims, defendants moved for an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), alleging 
plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought in bad faith and was without merit. R. 117-119; 120-156. 
At an October 23, 2007 hearing, the trial court orally ruled dismissing the case and 
awarding attorney fees to defendants. The court did not allow an opportunity for 
plaintiffs to respond to the motion for attorney fees. R. 802, Transcript, p. 19-20; 23-24. 
Plaintiffs' uncontroverted affidavits address the elements necessary for an award 
of fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The trial court disregarded 
that evidence and reaffirmed its precipitous ruling awarding fees to defendants. Judgment 
was granted against plaintiffs for approximately fifteen thousand dollars (-$15,000.00) in 
attorney fees pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended).3 R. 619; 658. 
3
 Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) is narrowly drawn and "not meant 
to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits." In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^  
46, 86 P.3d 712; Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46,1f 9,122 P.3d 556; 
Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
. . . We remind trial courts that the "reason for awarding attorney 
fees [based on bad faith] is to punish the wrongdoer, and not compensate 
the victim," and that fees should therefore be awarded only upon specific 
6 
That sum represented one-half (-Vz) of the fees claimed by defendants. Those judgments 
have been satisfied. Those judgments have not been appealed. Those erroneous earlier 
determinations, in large part, form the basis for the Rule 11 sanctions which are the 
subject matter of this appeal. R. 749; 750, ftnote 2; 763. 
After fees were awarded under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), the 
City Defendants moved for sanctions personally against plaintiffs' counsel, Brian M. 
Barnard pursuant to Rule 11. R. 631 -651. That motion did riot comply with the clear and 
specific requirements of Rule 11. 
Barnard submitted an uncontroverted affidavit addressing the issues raised in the 
Rule 11 motion. R. 687-690. Specifically he stated that he had researched Utah law with 
regard to declaratory judgments and that the complaint seeking declaratory relief was 
appropriate and clearly authorized by law. Secondly, he stated that the interpretation of 
the city ordinances which plaintiffs proposed was "warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law." Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 11. 
Relying exclusively on its earlier improper ruling under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(1953 as amended) against the plaintiffs, the court below awarded attorney fees against 
plaintiffs' counsel. Despite fatal procedural defects in the motion and a lack of 
supporting facts, the trial court awarded a judgment against Barnard personally for the 
evidence of bad faith. 
Still Standing at f 16. 
7 
sum often thousand dollars ($10,000.00) pursuant to Rule 11. Ignoring the specific 
procedural requirements of Rule 11, with little discussion or analysis, the trial court 
erroneously held that "substantial compliance" with that rule was sufficient. R. 750-753; 
764-766. 
This timely appeal (R.778) followed the award of attorney fees under Rule 11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Sixty-two (62) voters of Ogden City on October 1, 2007 sued seeking a 
declaratory judgment, equitable relief and an extraordinary writ. R. 1-44. 
2. The complaint was clear: "Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a 
determination regarding defendants' obligations under Ogden Municipal Code with 
regard to financial disclosures for candidates and personal campaign committees for 
candidates for municipal offices." R. 2, [^ 1; R. 3, Tf 9. 
3. The defendant City Recorder Cindi Mansell ("Mansell") and the defendant 
City Attorney Gary Williams ("Williams") filed a motion to dismiss, (R.l 13-116) a 
motion for expedited briefing and hearing, (R.l04-112) and a motion for an award of 
attorney fees on October 11, 2007. R. 117-119; 120-156. 
4. Defendants lodged an over length memorandum in support of those three 
(3) motions. R. 120-156. Defendants sought leave to file their over length memorandum 
outside the rules. R. 100-103; Ut.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 7(c)(2) (ten page limit absent leave of 
court). Leave was never formally granted. See Exhibit "E" attached, Electronic Docket. 
8 
5. The motion of Defendants for expedited briefing and hearing was never 
formally granted. See Court Docket, Exhibit "E" attached. 
6. Plaintiffs responded to defendants' motion to dismiss and opposed the 
motion for expedited briefing on October 22, 2007. R. 232-285; Exhibit "G" attached. 
7. A hearing was set on October 23, 2007 on motions to dismiss and plaintiffs' 
motion for immediate relief. October 10, 2007 Minute Entry in the electronic docket (p. 
7) attached as Exhibit "E." A copy of the actual notice generated by the court for said 
hearing is attached as Exhibit "F." R. 92. Neither the docket nor the notice of hearing 
show that the Motion for Attorney Fees was to be heard. 
8. Plaintiffs formally informed the Court that they would oppose defendants' 
motion for attorney fees. Exhibit "H" attached; R. 286-287. The deadline to respond to 
that fee motion (October 25, 2007, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 7) wap after the hearing set on the 
defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. 
9. At the hearing of October 23, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel objected to 
consideration of the motion for an award of attorney fees because, inter alia, (a) the 
motion had not been set for hearing, (b) plaintiffs had not yet filed a response to that 
motion, (c) no order had been entered granting expedited briefing or hearing on the 
motion, and, (d) the time for plaintiffs to respond to the motion had not yet expired. R. 
802; Transcript 19-20; 23-24 (pertinent excerpts of transcript attached to this brief). 
10. Over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel, the Court heard, considered and 
granted defendants' motion for an award of attorney fees. R 802; Transcript 19-20. 
9 
11. On November 23, 2007, twenty-one (21) affidavits by named plaintiffs 
were filed setting out their goals, purposes and good faith in filing this action. R. 322-
470. The trial court gave no weight to and/or disregarded those affidavits. R. 802.4 
12. On December 3, 2007, plaintiffs filed a memo opposing defendants' motion 
for attorney fees. R. 473-497. The trial court disregarded that memo. R. 802.4 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF OGDEN CITY MUNICIPAL CODE. 
13. All candidates for Ogden City offices must comply with the campaign 
finance disclosure requirements of Ogden City Municipal Code §§ 1-8-1 et seq. R. 5. 
Copies of the pertinent portions of the city election code are attached to plaintiffs' 
complaint as an Exhibit. R. 15, et seq. 
14. All election campaign activities must be conducted through an entity called 
a "personal campaign committee." Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-2(A). 
15. Subsection l-8-2(D) requires that candidates register their personal 
campaign committee with the City Recorder. 
4
 . . . The Court has already rejected plaintiffs5 inter-
pretation of the City ordinance and their position in the 
litigation and has already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit 
was brought without merit and in bad faith. The only issue 
remaining before the Court is the amount of attorney's fees 
and costs, if any, to be awarded to the defendants. 
* * * 
. . . Rather than address the present issue, the affi-
davit[s of plaintiffs] essentially restate[] the conclusions that 
are totally inconsistent with the prior rulings of this court. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 2, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 620. 
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16. Subsection l-8-4(B) requires that candidates arid/or personal campaign 
committees file financial statements on various dates. 
17. Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(A) provides: 
. . . If it appears that any candidate or personal campaign committee has failed to 
file a statement as required by law or if it appears that the statement does not 
conform to law or upon complaint in writing by a candidate or by a voter that a 
statement filed does not conform to law, the City Recorder shall notify the 
delinquent personal campaign committee or candidate, in writing, requesting 
compliance with this Chapter. 
18. The City Recorder must inspect the books of a personal campaign 
committee upon the failure of the candidate or committee to file a financial statement 
after notice under Subsection l-8-5(A). Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(B). 
19. Subsection l-8-5(D) provides a private right olfaction to registered voters 
such as the plaintiffs. It provides: 
In the event the City Recorder of the City Attorney refuses to take the actions 
provided by this Section, any registered voter in the City may institute appropriate 
proceedings for an extraordinary writ. 
Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-5(D). 
20. Subsection l-8-6(A) addresses the consequences of a candidate's failure to 
file the required financial statements. It provides: 
The name of a candidate shall not be printed on, or if already printed shall be 
removed from, the official ballot for the ensuing election unless the statements of 
contributions and expenditures relating to the candidate have been filed by the 
candidate of the candidate's personal committee as required by this Chapter. 
Ogden City Municipal Code § l-8-6(A). 
11 
APPLICATION OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS. 
21. As a mayoral candidate in the November 2007 election, Matthew Godfrey 
was subject to the Ogden City Municipal Code §§ 1-8-1 et seq. R. 5, ^  17-18. 
22. Godfrey operated a "personal campaign committee" as defined in Ogden 
City Municipal Code § 1-8-1. R. 6, ^ 27. 
23. Godfrey's "personal campaign committee" used the name "People to 
Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 6, \ 28. 
24. Godfrey never registered the name of his personal campaign committee 
"People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the Ogden City Recorder. R. 7, f 31. 
25. On September 13, 2007, plaintiff Dorothy Littrell ("Littrell") complained to 
Mansell that Godfrey failed to register "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the 
Ogden City Recorder. R. 7, fflf 32-33. 
26. On September 17, 2007 Mansell notified Godfrey that a complaint had been 
made that he had not registered "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 7, ^ f 34. 
27. Godfrey claimed he was not required to register "People to Re-Elect 
Matthew Godfrey" with the City Recorder. R. 8, \ 35. 
28. Godfrey claimed he was not required to file financial statements in the 
name of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" with the City Recorder. R. 8, ^  36. 
29. Littrell demanded that Mansell require Godfrey to produce and that Mansell 
examine all records of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey" under Ogden Municipal 
Code§ l-8-5(B). R. 9, If 41. 
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30. Mansell did not examine the records of "People to Re-Elect Matthew 
Godfrey" under Ogden Municipal Code § l-8-5(B). R. 8, t 3J8. 
PLAINTIFFS' GOALS, PURPOSES and GOOD FAITH 
31. The plaintiffs are interested in Ogden municipal government. They are 
active as to matters of concern to residents of Ogden City. They participate in the local 
political process. Aff of Rodriguez, ^ 4, R. 323; Plaintiffs' Affidavits, 14;5 R. 322-470. 
32. Plaintiffs participated in this lawsuit because of the importance of the issues 
raised and because of concern for the integrity of the election process in Ogden. 
Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 5. 
33. Plaintiffs sought interpretation of the ordinances and how they apply (or do 
not apply) to the situation presented by Godfrey. R. 1-44; Plaintiffs' Aff s. 1 6. 
34. This lawsuit sought remedies as provided by the Ogden election code. The 
lawsuit sought no monetary damages. Plaintiffs' Aff s. % 7. 
35. On November 6, 2007 the pertinent election was held. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 8. 
36. While many plaintiffs are not supporters of Matthew Godfrey, they bear no 
5
 Plaintiffs Dorothy E. Littrell, R. 399, James R. Briley, R. 364, Rulon Yorgason, 
R. 443, Charles L. Magruder, R. 457, Lily Magruder, R. 429, Cristina H. Rodriguez, R. 
332, Saul R. Aguilar, R. 336, Milton Rodriguez, R. 415, Rebecca P. Hernandez, R. 329, 
Ramon Aguilar, R. 343, Raymond D. Anderson, R. 371, Senorina D. Fernandez, R. 464, 
Epifano Gallegos, R. 422, Basil Beech, R. 357, Sharon Beech, R. 408, Katie Spendlove, 
R. 350, Jason Rusch, R. 392, David L. Rusch, R. 378, Cynthia Rusch, R. 385, Lavere W. 
Rawlins, R. 436, and F. Craig Hazen, R. 450, each filed similar affidavits setting forth 
their motivation and good faith in filing this action. These uncontroverted affidavits were 
filed on November 23, 2007. R. 322-470. Citations to "Plaintiffs' Aff s." are collectively 
to each and all of those affidavits which generally contain similarly numbered paragraphs. 
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malice nor ill will toward him. They believed, as the incumbent Mayor, Godfrey had a 
special obligation to comply with Ogden City Ordinances. As Mayor, he should have full 
accountability with the city's election laws and should be held to high standards. 
Plaintiffs' AfFs. 19. 
37. Plaintiffs bear no malice or ill will toward the City Defendants. Plaintiffs' 
Affs.^f 10. 
38. The plaintiffs reviewed the Ogden City election laws upon which suit was 
based. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f^ 11. From their reading of those election laws, they believed 
that all city candidates should register the actual name of his/her personal campaign 
committee with the City Recorder. It made no sense to plaintiffs, for a candidate to 
simply tell the City Recorder that a personal campaign committee has been formed but 
not to divulge the committee's name. A candidate is to use only one campaign committee 
and failure to register the name of that one committee might lead to violations and 
problems. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 1f 12. 
39. Plaintiffs understood the purpose for the registration of personal campaign 
committees was to publicly disclose what entity was accountable for campaigning and 
soliciting donations for a candidate. Accountability is not possible, or is severely 
hampered, if the actual name of the campaign committee is not divulged and registered. 
Plaintiffs'Aff s.TJ 13. 
40. Several different Ogden City elective offices were on the ballot for the 
November 6th election. Plaintiffs' desire was that all candidates fully comply with the city 
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election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f 14. 
41. Plaintiffs understood that a lawsuit could be brought only after Mansell or 
Williams received a complaint and failed to act. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 121. Plaintiffs are not 
aware of complaints made as to candidates other than Godfrey. Plaintiffs' Aff s. j^ 16. 
42. Plaintiff Littrell complained to Mansell and Williams that Godfrey had 
violated the election laws. Based upon that complaint, Mansell and Williams were to take 
certain action. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 18. Until a suspected violation is brought to the 
attention of Mansell and Williams, they are not required to act. Plaintiffs' Aff s. Tf 19. 
43. If a violation of the election law occurs, sanctions are provided for by 
Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-6. Those potential sanctions include removal of the 
candidate's name from the ballot. A candidate might be able to quickly remedy the 
violation and remain on the ballot. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ f 20. 
44. For effective sanctions, this lawsuit had to be resolved before the November 
6th election. Corrective actions by Godfrey (or other candidates) had to occur before the 
election. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 122. 
45. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment by a judge (and not by an 
appointed city official in the Mayor's administration, e.g., defendant Williams) 
interpreting and, if appropriate, applying the Ogden election ordinances. Plaintiffs' Aff s. 
Tf 23. They wanted the matter judicially considered before the November 6th election. 
Plaintiffs' Aff s. 124. 
46. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit because they believed that Mansell and Williams 
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failed to perform acts required under the ordinances. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 25. 
47. Filing this lawsuit, plaintiffs believed that Godfrey had failed to comply 
with the city election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ f 26. They believed that this lawsuit was a 
proper and valid method to seek an interpretation of and, if appropriate, to apply the 
Ogden City election laws. Plaintiffs' Aff s. f27 . 
48. Plaintiffs did not intend in any way to improperly impose upon or take 
advantage of any person by filing this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' Aff s. lj 28. 
49. Plaintiffs' goal in this lawsuit was not in any way to improperly hinder or 
delay the campaign or election process. Plaintiffs' Aff s. ^ 29. 
50. Plaintiffs were granted declaratory relief. As requested, the Court reviewed 
and interpreted certain election code ordinances. R. 619-623. Plaintiffs were denied 
injunctive relief in that the Court's interpretation of the ordinances differed from 
plaintiffs'proposed interpretation. R. 620. 
51. Plaintiffs' counsel researched the law with regard to declaratory judgments 
prior to the filing suit. R. 687-690. That research is reflected in the memoranda of law 
filed in this action. R. 232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598. 
52. Plaintiffs' counsel determined that under Utah law, concerned voters had 
the right to seek a judicial determination as to city ordinances regarding municipal 
elections and campaigns. R. 687-690. 
53. As detailed in their memorandums, plaintiffs believed that the interpretation 
by defendants renders several sections of Ogden City municipal code meaningless. R. 
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232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598. Plaintiffs advocated aifr interpretation to prevent 
the code sections from being rendered meaningless. Id 
54. Plaintiffs and counsel believed their arguments and proposed interpretation 
had a reasonable basis in Utah law. Id. Utah courts have oftin rejected statutory 
interpretations which render a statute useless and of no material benefit. Id. 
55. On October 11, 2007, counsel for the City Defendants sent a "warning 
letter" stating that defendants would seek Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel if 
the complaint was not voluntarily withdrawn. Exhibit "I" attached. The defendants 
stated they would not seek Rule 11 sanctions for twenty-one (21) days. Id. 
56. No motion nor supporting memorandum under!Rule 11 was prepared or 
served at that time by counsel for the City Defendants. See id.; R. 750-751. 
57. Less than twenty-one (<21) days after the wanting letter, on October 23, 
2007, the trial court orally dismissed the complaint. R. 802, Transcript, p. 19-20; 23-24. 
58. Five (5) months later, the City Defendants prepared, filed and served a 
motion for sanctions under Rule 11 with a supporting memorandum. R. 631; 649. 
Plaintiffs' counsel opposed that motion. R. 673; 687. 
59. The trial court granted sanctions personally against plaintiffs' counsel 
awarding a judgment of $10,000.00 in favor of the City Defendants. R. 748 (Exhibit "C" 
attached); R. 763 (Exhibit "D" attached). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants did not comply with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants' "warning letter" was not a motion as required. Plaintiffs were 
not afforded the mandatory safe harbor. A Rule 11 motion was served on March 28, 
2008, over five (5+) months after the oral dismissal of the complaint. Rule 11 motions 
filed after a dismissal of the underlying case must be denied. 
The trial court based its award of fees under Rule 11 upon its earlier erroneous 
award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The earlier improper award 
could not support the later Rule 11 award. 
No facts support the Rule 11 sanctions. No findings of fact made by the trial court 
support the Rule 11 sanctions. 
Findings of fact are required to support fee awards under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-
56 (1953 as amended). The court below failed to make independent findings or made 
such findings based on insufficient facts. 
This action was brought in good faith and sought the relief provided by Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs should be assessed attorney fees even though the 
trial court rejected plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the ordinances at issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) authorizes an award of attorney 
fees only upon a finding that the suit (a) was frivolous and (b) was not brought in good 
faith. In this case, both elements are lacking. Plaintiffs reasonably argued defendants' 
interpretation of the relevant sections of Ogden City election code is legally flawed 
18 
because it renders ordinances meaningless and of no effect. Plaintiffs acted in the public 
interest and in good faith. Defendants fail to meet their burden to show bad faith. 
The trial court did not allow plaintiffs to respond to the attorney fees motion 
precipitously granting it over objections of plaintiffs' counsel and without due process. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) allowfe an award of attorney fees 
"only if the trial court determines that the claim . . . asserted , . . was meritless; and that 
claim . . . was asserted in bad faith." Chipman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1997).6 The facts of this case and the applicable law do not support a finding of 
meritlessness nor bad faith. The trial court's erroneous fee aWard under Ut. Code Ann. 
§78-27-56 (1953 as amended) served as the foundation for the court's subsequent 
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 against counsel. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows sanctions if a pleading is presented 
to a court by an attorney (i) who has not made an inquiry rea$onable under the circum-
stances to determine whether the pleading makes claims warranted by existing law or by a 
non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law, or, (ii) if the pleading is presented for an improper purpose 
6
 "Meritless" as used in the statute is not simply losing a claim. A claim is 
"without merit," if the claim is frivolous, is of little weight or importance having no basis 
in law or fact, or clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery. Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^  30, 61 P.3d 1009 rehearing denied. Meritlessness is 
not determined in hindsight merely because the party's claim was not successful. 
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(such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation). 
Specific procedures are set out in Rule 11 for a motion seeking sanctions. The 
City Defendants did not follow those procedures. The trial court erroneously found that 
"substantial compliance" with those procedures was sufficient. 
The facts of this case and the applicable law do not support the findings required 
for sanctions under Rule 11. 
I. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 
The overwhelming majority of reported decisions considering sanctions under 
Rule 11 require strict compliance with its specific requirements, to-wit: a written motion 
and supporting memorandum served twenty-one (21) days prior to their being filed with 
the court so as to allow opposing counsel to withdraw an allegedly offending pleading or 
paper. The City Defendants failed to comply with those provisions. The trial court 
disregarded the non-compliance and erroneously awarded sanctions under Rule 11. 
No reported Utah cases have ruled on the Rule 11 procedures involved in this case, 
however a number of federal case have done so. "Utah's rule 11 was patterned after the 
federal rule 11 promulgated in 1983." Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 
P.2d 462, 464-465 (Utah \99S)( citing Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1992)). The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal authority addressing the 
application of federal Rule 11 is "helpful to our understanding the [state] rule." Morse v. 
Packer, 2000 UT 86, 15 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Utah 2000); see also Kaiserman Associates, 
Inc. v. Francis Town. 15 P.3d 1021, 1028 (Utah 2000); Barnard. 846 P.2d at 1223. 
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Courts applying federal Rule 11 have consistently required strict compliance with 
its procedural mandates noting that "[i]t is clear from the language [of the rule] that it 
imposes mandatory obligations upon the party seeking sanctions, so that failure to comply 
with the procedural requirements precludes the imposition of the requested sanctions." 
Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng.. Inc.. 369 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004). 
The majority rule as to Rule 11 requires a formal motion and supporting 
memorandum to be formally served and the full safe harbor period to be afforded to the 
non-moving party. Ridder v. City of Springfield. 109 F.3d 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that "sanctions under Rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is 
served on the opposing party for the full twenty-one day 'safe harbor5 period before it is 
filed with or presented to the court"); Carruthers v. Flaum. 450 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The law in this Circuit is clear: the only way to start the 21 day clock 
running is for a party seeking sanctions to serve a fully supported motion."); Gal v. 
Viacom Inf 1. Inc.. 403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]he plain language of 
the rule states explicitly that service of the motion itself is required to begin the safe 
harbor clock — the rule says nothing about the use of letters."); Radcliffe v. Rainbow 
Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Although % defendant had given 
informal warnings to the plaintiffs threatening to seek Rule 1|1 sanctions, these warnings 
did not satisfy the strict requirement that a motion be served on the opposing party 
twenty-one days prior to filing."); Barber v. Miller. 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It 
would therefore wrench both the language and purpose of the amendment to the Rule to 
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permit an informal warning to substitute for service of a motion."). 
In Roth v. Green, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that warning 
letters sent to the respondent in advance of filing were insufficient to comply with the 
service requirement. 466 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006). After analyzing the 
language of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Notes, the Tenth Circuit concluded that 
"warning letters, such as those sent by defendants to [counsel], are supplemental to, and 
cannot be deemed an adequate substitute for, the service of the motion itself." Id. at 
1192. The court went on to state: 
The reason for requiring a copy of the motion itself, rather than simply a 
warning letter, to be served on the allegedly offending party is clear. The 
safe harbor provisions were intended to "protect[] litigants from sanctions 
whenever possible in order to mitigate Rule 1 lfs chilling effects, formaliz[e] 
procedural due process considerations such as notice for the protection of 
the party accused of sanctionable behavior, and encourag[e] the withdrawal 
of papers that violate the rule without involving the district court." Thus, "a 
failure to comply with them [should] result in the rejection of the motion for 
sanctions." 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1337.2, at 722-23 (3d ed. 2004)). In addition to the Tenth, the 
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all taken a similar approach to interpreting 
the requirements of Rule 11. In re: Jack E. Pratt. Jr.. Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 
580, 588 (5th Cir. 2008) ("we have continually held that strict compliance with Rule 11 is 
mandatory. We may not disregard the plain language of the statute and our prior 
precedent without evidence of congressional intent to allow 'substantial compliance' 
through informal service"); Brickwood Contractors. Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g. Inc.. 369 F.3d 
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385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 
2001) ("[T]he fact that the plaintiffs had advance warning th^t Rainbow objected to their 
conspiracy allegation did not cure Rainbow's failure to comply with the strict procedural 
requirement of Rule 11(c)(1)(A)."); see also Gordon v. Unifund CCR Partners. 345 F.3d 
1028, 1030 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying Rule 11 sanctions because the defendant sent 
informal letters to the plaintiff instead of a copy of the motion for sanctions). 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated: 
Compliance with the service requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an 
award of sanctions under Rule 11. "[S]uch service [is required] to give the 
parties at whom the motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or 
correct the offending contention." [See Elliott v. Tilton. 64 F.3d 213, 216 
(5th Cir. 1995)]. Although we have not directly addressed whether informal 
notice is sufficient, several other circuits have addressed the issue in the 
context of Rule 11 and determined that it is insufficient to comply with the 
text and spirit of the Rule. 
In re: Jack E. Pratt Jr., Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2008) (ftnotes 
omitted). 
Strict compliance with procedures is required to impose sanctions under Rule 11. 
Cases Cited by Trial Court Re: Disregard of Rule 11 Procedures 
The trial court cited only two (2) cases in support of its decision to disregard the 
procedural requirement of Rule 11. R. 751, p. 4, Exhibit "C" attached. Those cases are 
inapposite and/or represent a minority application of Rule 111. 
Methode Electronics. Inc. v. Adam Technologies. Inc.. 371 F. 3d 923 (7th Cir. 
2004) was not resolved under Rule 11(b) on a request initiated by a party. The trial judge 
issued an order to show cause why the plaintiffs should not be sanctioned under Rule 11. 
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Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The court initiated order to show cause 
remained pending. The trial judge concluded that plaintiff had no evidentiary basis for 
the venue alleged in the complaint and that the conduct was "intentionally deceptive" 
toward the court. Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the trial judge imposed sanctions of 
$10,000.00 payable to the court, and a portion defendant's attorneys fees. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the award was sustainable as an 
imposition of sanctions within the court's inherent power and not under Rule 11. 
Methode at 926 (7th Cir. 2004). The court specifically declined to decide whether Rule 11 
sanctions were appropriate despite non-compliance with Rule 11. Id at 927. The 
Methode court did not uphold counsel initiated sanctions under Rule 11. 
Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2003) is not followed by 
other courts and is contrary to the consistent majority interpretation of Rule 11. The 
Seventh Circuit awarded sanctions under Rule 11 even though the defendant had sent the 
respondent only a "letter" and not a copy of a motion for sanctions. In reaching its 
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit did not address the language of Rule 11, the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the Rule, or any other Rule 11 jurisprudence. The court 
simply stated that the "[defendants have complied substantially with Rule 11(c)(1)(A) 
and are entitled to a decision on the merits of their request for sanctions under Rule 11." 
Id. Because the Seventh Circuit provided little analysis and cited no authority, the 
propriety of its holding has been called into doubt. See Roth, 466 F.3d at 1193 ("We find 
[Nisenbaum] unpersuasive, however, because it contains no analysis of the language of 
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Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or the Advisory Committee Notes, cites to no authority for its holding, 
and indeed is the only published circuit decision reaching sudh a conclusion.")-
We are not persuaded that informal service is sufficient to satisfy the 
service requirement of Rule 9011 .[7] Contrary to the holding in Nisenbaum, 
the plain language of [Bankruptcy] Rule 9011 mandates that the movant 
serve the respondent with a copy of the motion before filing it with the 
court. There is no indication in Rule 9011 (or Rule 11) or in the advisory 
notes to support [appellant's] contention that a motion for sanctions may be 
filed with the court without serving the respondent with a copy at least 
twenty-one days in advance. 
In re: Jack E. Pratt, Jr.. Debtor. Cadle v. Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 588 (5th Cir. 2008). 
II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 NOT FOLLOWED 
Rule 11(c)(1)(A) specifies certain procedural requirements 
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall. . . describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in 
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1)(A). 
Rule 11 requires service a motion and a supporting memorandum and requires that 
the other party be allowed 21 days to withdraw the challenged paper. Neither require-
ment was fulfilled in the case at bar. 
7
 Federal Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is substantially identical to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, therefore, the court referred to Rule 11 jurisprudence when considering 
sanctions under Rule 9011. In re: Jack E. Pratt. Jr.. Debtor, Cadle v. Pratt. 524 F.3d 580, 
586 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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A. October 11, 2007 Warning Letter was Not Required Motion. 
The City Defendants' "warning letter" was dated October 11, 2007. Exhibit "I" 
attached. The letter says a Rule 11 motion will be filed z/the complaint is not withdrawn. 
("We will hold off filing a formal Rule 11 motion until expiration of the 21 days safe 
harbor deadline. If the Complaint has not been voluntarily withdrawn before then, we 
will proceed to file our Rule 11 motion." Id.). The letter recites a future intent.8 
That "warning letter" does not contain any legal or factual argument related to 
Rule 11. Rather than legal analysis found in a supporting legal memorandum, the 
"warning letter" is merely a strong demand letter. 
Rule 11 requires a written motion and a supporting memorandum. Rule 7(c)(1), 
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. The City Defendants never timely prepared nor served a motion. No 
supporting memorandum accompanied the "warning letter." 
B. Required Twenty-one (21) Days Safe Harbor. 
Assuming the City Defendants' warning letter complied with the requirements of 
Rule 11, plaintiffs and counsel had until November 5, 2007 to withdraw the complaint. 
The Court held an expedited hearing on October 23, 2007 and dismissed the 
Complaint. That dismissal, prior to the expiration of the safe harbor time limit, precluded 
8
 Separate from the procedural requirements of Rule 11, the "warning letter" 
clearly states the City Defendants will not file a Rule 11 motion for twenty-one (21) days. 
Plaintiffs and their counsel reasonably relied on that representation as to whether and 
when the City Defendants would act under Rule 11. 
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plaintiffs from withdrawing the complaint. Counsel can not fye sanctioned under Rule 11 
when the challenged pleading was dismissed within the twenty-one (21) days period. 
Rule 11 "imposes mandatory obligations upon the pariy seeking sanctions, so that 
failure to comply with the procedural requirements precludes the imposition of the 
requested sanctions." Brickwood Contractors. Inc. v. Datanet Engineering. Inc.. 369 F.3d 
385, 389 (4th Cir. 2004); Roth v. Green. 466 F.3d 1179, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006); Gordon 
v.UnifundCCR Partners. 345 F.3d 1028, 1030 (8th Cir.2003); Radcliffe v. Rainbow 
Constr. Co.. 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir.2001); AeroTech. Inc. v. Estes. 110 F.3d 1523, 
1528-29 (10th Cir.1997); Ridder v. City of Springfield. 109 F.3d 288, 296 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Elliott v. Tilton. 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1995); Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp.. 48 
F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir.1995). Rule 11 is intended "to give the parties at whom the 
motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending contention." 
Aerojech, 110 F.3d at 1528-29. 
The trial court erroneously found the letter sent by counsel for Mansell and 
Williams "substantially complies with the requirements of Rule 11" and that the 12 days 
afforded plaintiffs' counsel prior to the October 23, 2007 hearing "was enough time for 
[plaintiffs' counsel] to consider the possibility of sanctions[.]" R. 751. The court below 
also erroneously concluded that the "reason more time was riot allowed to pass was 
because Plaintiffs requested an expedited hearing" and they "can not now use the 
expedited hearing timetable that [they] requested as a shield against Rule 11 sanctions." 
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R. 752.9 Plaintiffs never requested an expedited hearing on any of Defendants' motions. 
The court awarded sanctions despite the lack of compliance with the safe harbor 
requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 
C. Rule 11 Motion Filed after the Case is Dismissed 
The Court orally dismissed plaintiffs' complaint at the close of the hearing of 
October 23rd. R. 802, Transcript, 31-37. More than five (5+) months later, the City 
Defendants prepared and filed a Rule 11 motion. R. 631; R. 649. A Rule 11 motion 
served and filed after the underlying case has been dismissed must be denied. The reason 
is the opposing party no longer has the power or ability to withdraw or correct the 
challenged pleading. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Ridder. 109 F.3d at 294-95, 297; Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir.1998). 
III. NO FACTS SUPPORT FINDING A VIOLATION OF RULE 11 
Rule 11(b), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. requires an attorney to certify that "to the best of [his / 
her] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances" a pleading presented to a court 
• is not presented for an improper purpose (such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation), and 
• makes claims warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new 
9
 While plaintiffs requested a hearing on their motion for immediate injunctive 
relief, plaintiff did not request an expedited hearing on the motion to dismiss nor on the 
motion for attorney fees. No order for or notice of an expedited hearing on the fee motion 
was ever made. See Exhibit "E" attached. 
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law. 
In this case, the trial court made no finding and included no discussion in its ruling 
and order as to the propriety of plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs' 
counsel submitted an uncontroverted affidavit (R. 687-690) that he researched the law 
with regard to declaratory judgments and determined that plaintiffs had the right to file 
such an action as to the ordinances at issue. IdL referencing memorandums filed herein R. 
232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 559-598. Filing such an action under the Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Act and simply asking for an interpretation of certain city ordinances can not be 
in violation of Rule 11. 
In addition to asking for a judicial interpretation of the city's election ordinances, 
plaintiffs proposed their own interpretation of the ordinances. Plaintiffs reasonably 
suggested what they believed the ordinances meant and how they should be interpreted 
and applied. R. 1-44 (complaint); R. 322-470 (affidavits); R, 232-282; 291-302; 473-497; 
559-598 (memorandums). Rule 11 is not violated if the attoitneyfs reading of the law is 
reasonable. After conducting appropriate research, the mere fact that attorney's view of 
the law was wrong cannot support finding of a Rule 11 violation. Plaintiffs' counsel's 
arguments and interpretation were objectively reasonable wfyen compared to existing law. 
Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992). 
Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive legal research; the 
appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances. Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, ^  8; 16? P.3d 747, rehearing denied, 
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cert, denied 186 P.3d 957; Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992). The 
research and the conclusion reached by plaintiffs' counsel were objectively reasonable. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT MADE INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO SUPPORT 
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDS. 
The court below failed to make independent bad faith findings or made such 
findings based on insufficient facts. Under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as 
amended) and under Rule 11, the trial court must make adequate and specific factual 
findings. Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, ]f 10, 985 P.2d 255, 258-259 (detailed findings 
required to impose Rule 11 sanctions). Detailed findings are required under Ut. Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended), especially when facts are in dispute or ambiguous. 
In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, Tf 52, 86 P.3d 712 quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
at 788 (Utah 1991) ("while the district court's failure to enter a specific finding . . . alone 
does not warrant reversal, we cannot uphold its finding where 'the ambiguity of the facts 
makes [an assumption of bad faith] unreasonable'."); Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 
40, Tf 15, 178 P.3d 922 (citing Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983)). 
Specific findings are required to support a conclusion of meritlessness and bad 
faith. 
"In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) 
(2002). The plain language of the statute details three (3) requirements that must 
be met before fees are awarded: " \\) the party must prevail, (2) the claim 
asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the claim must not 
be brought or asserted in good faith.5" 
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Gallegos v. Llovd. 2008 UT App 40, If 9, 178 P.3d 922 (citations omitted). 
A. Findings as per Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions. There were insufficient facts before the trial court for it to make the necessary 
findings.10 The Rule 11 memorandum decision (R. 748) and the order based thereon (R. 
763) are respectively Exhibits "C" and "D" attached. 
The factual findings11 to purportedly support the Rule 11 sanctions fee award 
against counsel for plaintiffs are: 
. . . On or about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City 
Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a letter advising him that they intended to seek 
Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued the action. Mr. Barnard elected 
to press forward with the lawsuit. 
On October 23, 2007, the court conducted a hearing in this matter. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, 
finding that it was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith, justifying an 
award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Memorandum Decision, 06/27/08, pp. 2-3, Exhibit "C" attached, R. 749 - 750. 
The court has already found that this complaint was meritless and 
was filed in bad faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly 
enforcing the City's election ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. It was 
an attempt to discredit one particular candidate in an attempt to influence 
the upcoming election. This case was an abuse of the judicial process, and 
the court concludes that it was filed for an improper purpose within the 
10
 When challenging a district court's findings of fact, the challenging party must 
show that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the district court, is legally 
insufficient to support the contested finding. Still Standing at f 8. The facts which were 
presented to and considered by the trial court are very limited 
11
 The trial court did not set out distinct and specific findings of fact, but instead 
interspersed them amongst legal analysis and legal conclusions. R. 748; 763. 
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meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). Because this lawsuit was frivolous and filed in 
bad faith and for an improper purpose, the court concludes that Mr. Barnard 
has violated subdivisions (1) and (2) and Rule 11(b). 
Memorandum Decision, 06/27/08, p. 3, Exhibit "C" attached, R. 750; see Order, 
07/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "D" attached, R. 765. 
2
 The Court adopts and incorporates its February 29, 2008 
Memorandum Decision and April 8, 2008 Order as if fully set 
forth herein. 
Order, 07/29/08, p. 3, ftnote 2, Exhibit "D" attached, R. 765. 
As per above, the trial court's findings to support its conclusion of a Rule 11 
violation are synthesized as: 
• On October 11, 2007, counsel for the City Defendants sent a warning letter. 
• The court had already found that the complaint was meritless and filed in bad faith. 
The Court incorporated its Februaiy 29, 2008 Memorandum Decision and April 8, 
2008 Order as per Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). 
• This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly enforcing the City's election 
ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. 
• This lawsuit was an attempt to discredit one particular candidate.12 
• This suit attempted to improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election.12 
Even if the foregoing statements were supported by evidence, they are not 
sufficient under Rule 11 to establish the elements necessary to impose sanctions. 
The trial court's findings regarding Rule 11 sanctions do not reveal the court's 
reasoning clearly enough that this Court can apply the appropriate standard of review to 
12
 The mere filing of this action does not support this finding; no other evidence is 
presented. 
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each element of the trial court's ruling. 
We conclude that this purported factual finding, . . . simply 
paraphrasing the language of rule 11, and standing by itself without any 
detailed factual findings particularizing its conclusions is insufficiently 
specific as a matter of law to support the imposition of rule 11 sanctions. 
We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact 
in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226, 230 
(Utah 1997). This is particularly necessary in the rule 11 area. The law 
requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual findings as a 
predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated, and then must 
determine the appropriate sanction. The trial court's findings and 
conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an 
appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of 
the trial court's ruling. What we have before us is plainly insufficient for 
that purpose. 
Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78,110, 985 P.2d 255, 258-250. 
A trial court must also make specific factual findings as a predicate to determine 
the appropriate sanction. Id. The court below made no findings and included no 
discussion as to how or why it determined an award of fees was appropriate or that ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00) was an appropriate amount. See R. 748; R. 763 (Exhibits 
"C" & "D"attached). 
No facts before the trial court support the factual findings and the legal conclusion 
that Rule 11 was violated and that an award of attorney fees was an appropriate sanction. 
B. Findings as per Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) 
The trial court's award of fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) 
is pertinent to this appeal because the Rule 11 sanctions were based, in large part, upon 
that prior improper and erroneous ruling. 
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support an award of attorney 
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fees under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). There were insufficient facts 
before the trial court for it to make the necessary findings. The memorandum decision ®. 
619) and the order based thereon (R. 658) which contain the inadequate findings are 
attached to this brief. Exhibits "A" and "B" attached. 
The trial court's factual findings13 to purportedly support the fee award under Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) are: 
At the hearing in this matter held on October 23, 2007, the Court 
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with 
prejudice. This Court also found that the plaintiffs' complaint was 
frivolous and had been filed in bad faith. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/2008, p. 1, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 619. 
. . . The Court has already rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of the 
City ordinance and their position in the litigation and has already 
determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad 
faith. The only issue remaining before the Court is the amount of attorney's 
fees and costs, if any, to be awarded to the defendants. 
. . . Rather than address the present issue, the affidavits of plaintiffs] 
essentially restate[] the conclusions that are totally inconsistent with the 
prior rulings of this court. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 2, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 620. 
13
 The trial court did not set out distinct separate findings of fact, but interspersed 
them amongst legal analysis and legal conclusions. R. 619; 658. 
This Court has stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has . . . cautioned against conflating the 
issues of merit and bad faith. See, e.g., Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 
2005 UT 46, lfl[ 10, 16-17, 122 P.3d 556; In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, | 
49, 86 P.3d 712. Consequently, we examine the without merit element of 
section 78-27-56 independently of the bad faith requirement. 
Gallegos v. Llovd. 178 P.3d 922, 2008 UT App 40, ^ 22, certiorari denied 189 P.3d 1276. 
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This lawsuit was not about interpreting an ordinance and having all 
the candidates removed from the ballot because of their failure to make 
disclosures. It was an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as 
a candidate for mayor. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 621. 
. . . The judicial system should not be used for political and 
vindictive purposes and plaintiffs and their attorneys have a duty to make 
sure that a lawsuit has merit and is brought in good faith. Filing frivolous 
non-meritorious lawsuits targeting a person running for public office should 
be chilled. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 3, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 621. 
. . . Approximately one-third of those plaintiffs have signed an 
identical affidavit informing the court that they had the exact same feeling 
about filing the lawsuit, went through the exact same process of reviewing 
the ordinance, and reached the exact same conclusions. None of the twenty 
plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits apparently reviewed the memoran-
dum prepared by their City Attorney which put them on notice that their 
position was flawed. None have informed the court that their counsel 
reviewed the memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the oppor-
tunity to correct their misunderstanding of the plain language of the 
ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Not one of the twenty plaintiffs 
informed the court by way of affidavit that their attorney had been put on 
notice that Defendants would be seeking attorney fees if the lawsuit was not 
voluntarily withdrawn and decided to proceed not withstanding the risk of 
substantial award of attorneys fees. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, pp. 3-4, Exhibit "A" attadhed, R. 621 - 622. 
This Court does not believe that the vast majority of the plaintiffs in 
this case had any idea of the consequences of filing this vindictive, 
frivolous, bad faith action. 
Memorandum Decision, 02/29/08, p. 4, Exhibit "A" attached, R. 622; Order, 04/08/08, 
pp. 6-7, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 663 - 664. 
[1] c. . . . Mayor Godfrey was not required to provide the name of 
his PCC [Personal Campaign Committee] on his financial statements. 
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Order, 04/08/08, p. 4, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 661. 
[1] d. Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the ordinance did not require 
that registration and financial statements set forth the specific name of the 
candidate's PCC. Rather, the ordinance is very clear and simple and places 
the responsibility to make such filings on the candidate. 
Order, 04/08/08, p. 5, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 662. 
[2] d. The Court specifically determined that the plaintiffs' lawsuit 
was without merit. This determination was based upon the fact that the 
ordinance in question is simple and clear, and the plaintiffs' position is 
entirely unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and in direct 
conflict with Utah statutory construction law. Stated differently, plaintiffs 
lawsuit was frivolous and had no basis in law or fact. 
[2] e. The Court further determined that plaintiffs brought this 
lawsuit in bad faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, 
analyzed and appropriately rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this 
lawsuit was filed. The Court reviewed the City Attorney's memorandum 
addressing plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and found the memo-
randum to be accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum put 
plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the 
timing of plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election) 
and the fact that plaintiffs targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit 
(even though he used the same forms as every other candidate and no other 
candidate listed the name of the PCC on the registration and financial 
statements) further demonstrates that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in bad 
faith and in an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election. 
These facts all establish that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of their actions; (2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of the defendants through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs 
intended to improperly influence the outcome of the mayoral election 
through their actions. 
Order, 04/08/08, pp. 5-6, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 662 - 663. 
[2] h. The court also relies on the reasons set forth in the Court's 
Memorandum Decision dated February 29, 2008. 
Order, 04/08/08, p. 7, Exhibit "B" attached, R. 664. 
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As per above, although mixed and combined with consideration of the merits of 
pfamfr'AV cfaims, the trial court's findings to support a concision of bad faith are 
synthesized as: 
The ordinance did not require that registration and financial statements set forth 
the specific name of the candidate's PCC. 
• The questioned ordinance is very clear and simple and places the responsibility to 
make required filings on the candidate. 
The plaintiffs' position is unsupported by the plain language of the ordinance and 
ill direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law.l 
The lawsuit was an attempt to discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a 
candidate for mayor.14 
The lawsuit targeted only one candidate. 
Plaintiffs' claims were reviewed and rejected by the City Attorney before this 
lawsuit was filed. Plaintiffs did not review the memo prepared by the City 
Attorney. From that memo, plaintiffs were on notice that their position lacked 
merit. 
Plaintiffs did not reveal to the court that they w^re given the opportunity to correct 
their misunderstanding of the ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs did not reveal to the court that their attorney had been put on notice that 
Defendants would seek attorney fees if the lawsuit was not voluntarily withdrawn. 
The vast majority of the plaintiffs did not understand the consequences of filing a 
vindictive, frivolous, bad faith action. 
The timing of plaintiffs' lawsuit was suspect (filed jupt weeks before the general 
election). 
The lawsuit was an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election.14 
14
 The mere filing of this action does not suppoit this finding; no other evidence is 
presentecl. 
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Even if the foregoing statements were supported by evidence, they are not 
sufficient under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) to establish frivolousness 
and bad faith necessary to support an award of attorney fees. 
V. PLAINTIFFS PENALIZED FOR SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF 
This action sought declaratory relief.15 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides a 
means for securing a judicial adjudication of legal rights and the interpretation of 
ordinances and statutes. Parker v. Rampton. 497 P.2d 848, 851-852 (Utah 1977); Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953 as amended)., The Act grants jurisdiction to Utah district 
courts to hear complaints seeking declaratory relief. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1953 as 
amended). 
Utah courts are to be indulgent in entertaining actions brought to achieve the 
objectives of the Declaratory Judgment Act, and more particularly so where there is 
substantial public interest to be served by settlement of issue. Salt Lake County v. Salt 
Lake City. 570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977). A declaratory judgment is proper remedy 
"whenever it will serve a useful purpose in settling the uncertainty and insecurity giving 
rise to proceeding." Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1944). 
The statutory provisions regarding declaratory judgments are to be broadly 
construed to serve the purpose of resolving questions and ending uncertainty as to legal 
15
 "Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a determination regarding defendants' 
obligations under Ogden Municipal Code with regard to financial disclosures for 
candidates and personal campaign committees for candidates for municipal offices." R. 
2,f l\seeR. 3,19. 
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rights. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12 (1953 as amended) provides: 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford 
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other 
legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered. 
Plaintiffs were authorized under the Declaratory Judgment Act to bring this action 
to have their rights and the construction, interpretation and applicability of provisions of 
the Ogden City election code determined. Plaintiffs should not be penalized for utilizing 
that statute in the exact manner and for the exact purpose for which it was enacted. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS NOT ALLOWED TO RESPOND TO THE ATTORNEYS FEE 
MOTION 
The trial court heard and granted the motion for attorney fees under Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) without giving plaintiffs an opportunity to respond. With 
no prior notice and over plaintiffs' counsel's objections, the trial court heard and granted 
the motion for attorney fees. R. 802, Transcript, pp. 19-20; 23-24; 31-37. 
Conducting that hearing and making that ruling violated the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, (Rule 7(c)) and basic constitutional due process protections. 
No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that 
claims allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not 
be deprived of his property without first being afforded due process of law. 
This guarantee is enshrined in both the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Utah. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. . 
. . "[W]e long ago succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due 
process, observing that it requires that notice be given to the person whose 
rights are to be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon 
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Pangea Techs., Inc. v. 
Internet Promotions. Inc., 2004 UT 40, f 8, 94 P.3d 257 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The bare essentials of due process thus mandate adequate 
notice to those with an interest in the matter and an opportunity for them to 
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be heard in a meaningful manner. See Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ^ f 68, 
100 P.3d 1177. 
Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants. Inc.. 2007 UT 17, f 28, 156 P.3d 782, 788. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure owe their existence to the 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. They "[are] designed to 
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts 
[can] follow and rely upon." Gillett v. Price. 2006 UT 24, % 13, 135 P.3d 
861 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our rules of 
civil procedure lend operational expression to the abstract constitutional 
promise of due process. 
Id. at 129. 
The order under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) is without basis and 
is illegitimate having been granted without due process.16 
VII. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE NOT FRIVOLOUS 
Defendants argued that plaintiffs' position was without merit because the Ogden 
City Attorney concluded that Godfrey had not violated Ogden City election ordinances 
and said so in a written memorandum. See R. 131. The court below found that argument 
to be persuasive, if not, conclusive. R. 621 - 622; 662 - 663. 
Plaintiffs clearly had the right to seek a declaratory judgment and a judicial 
determination of their rights and the meaning of the ordinances. Plaintiffs argue that the 
interpretation of Ogden City municipal code advocated by the defendants renders multiple 
sections of Ogden City election code meaningless and is therefore legally defective. R. 
16
 Similarly, the trial court's failure to follow the dictates of Rule 11 before 
imposing sanctions was a violation of due process. 
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232-234. Plaintiffs' arguments have reasonable basis. Utah courts have repeatedly 
rejected statutory interpretations that would render a statute "liseless and of no material 
benefit." Industrial Commission v. Dalv Mining Co.. 172 P. 301, 306 (Utah 1918); see 
also Thomas v. Color Country Mangmt. 2004 UT 12, ^  46, 84 P.3d 1201 (Chief Justice 
Durham concurring) (Utah 2004); and, State ex rel E.H.. 880 P.2d 11,13 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1994). 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS BROUGHT SUIT IN GOOD FAITff 
A. The City Attorney's legal opinion does not constitute a legal finding and is not 
determinative of plaintiffs' good faith. 
The court below determined that plaintiffs should not have filed this suit because 
the City Attorney told the plaintiffs they were "wrong."17 The court indicated all 
discussion should have ended when the City Attoreny informed plaintiffs that he had 
determined their concerns were "without merit and contrary to the relevant ordinance."18 
R. 134-135. However, an opinion of a City Attorney is not i finding of law and in no way 
precludes a plaintiff from seeking a legal determination by a court, i.e., a declaratory 
judgment. See Peterson v. South Salt Lake City, 987 P.2d. 57, 59 (Utah 1999). 
Plaintiffs sincerely believed that Williams' interpretation of the ordinance was 
legally flawed; therefore they sought a judicial determination. Plaintiffs' claims were 
17
 In litigation, it is rare that one party does not strongly inform the opposing party 
that they are "wrong" and their legal position without merit. 
18
 If City Attorneys were always undeniably "correct," the workload of the courts 
would be greatly reduced. 
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based on a good faith belief that Williams' interpretation is legally defective. 
B. Plaintiffs could not file suit regarding other candidates. 
Plaintiffs were sincerely concerned about enforcing Ogden City Code despite not 
filing suit against all defaulting candidates. The Ogden City election code imposes 
certain notice requirements before a candidate is subject to the penalties. Section 1-8-
5(B). These notice requirements were satisfied only as to Godfrey. The City Recorder 
notified Godfrey of Littrell's complaint pursuant to § l-8-5(A) on September 17, 2007.19 
R. 7, | 34. Only Godfrey was given notice under § l-8-5(A). Plaintiffs could not have 
sought an order compelling Mansell and Williams to act against other candidates.20 
C. The timing of the suit was necessitated by the Ogden City Code. 
There is nothing sinister about the timing of the complaint. Plaintiff Littrell first 
became aware of Defendant Godfrey's failure to file in September, 2007. She promptly 
complained to the City Recorder, Mansell. R. 7, ^ 32. Mansell notified Godfrey of 
Littrell's complaint on September 17, 2007. R. 7, % 34. Godfrey responded to Mansell 
and asserted that he was not required to register or file financial declarations in the name 
of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 8,1 35. Littrell then demanded that 
Mansell inspect the books of "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey." R. 9, ^ 41. When 
19
 The fact that Mansell acted upon Littrell's complaint and asked Godfrey to 
respond shows certain merit to Littrell's concerns. 
20
 The thrust of this action was not against one candidate, but against the two (2) 
city officials charged with overseeing the municipal elections. If the trial court had ruled 
in favor of plaintiffs, that ruling would have been applicable to all candidates even though 
not named as parties to this suit. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, t 12, 99 P.3d 842. 
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Mansell failed to inspect the books and Williams failed to initiate legal proceedings, 
plaintiffs promptly filed suit on October 1, 2007. Plaintiffs precisely followed the 
procedure required under Ogden City election code. When they realized that neither 
Mansell nor Williams were going to remedy a perceived violation, plaintiffs took legal 
action. Plaintiffs sought only remedies specifically provided for by Utah statutes and 
Ogden City election code. Had plaintiffs filed suit after the election, the equitable relief 
sought would have been rendered moot. 
The date of the filing of this lawsuit shows that plaintiffs wanted a resolution 
before the November 6th election. That does not evince bad faith. 
D. No facts establish "lack of merit" nor "bad faith" in this action. 
i) Lack of Merit 
A trial court's determination that a claim was without merit is a question of law. In 
re: Olympus Const. LC. 2007 UT App 361, Tf 9, 173 P.3d 192. To establish that a claim 
is without merit as per the statute, "a party must show that the claim is frivolous" or "of 
little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1983). The mere fact that plaintiffs were not fully successful (that is, their 
interpretation was ultimately not accepted by the trial Court) does not render their 
complaint and claims "meritless" or "frivolous" under the statute. See icL 
As to plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the election ordinances, the trial court 
provides little or no legal analysis and only strong conclusions. However, the trial court's 
ruling does not establish that the claim was frivolous or had no basis in law or in fact. 
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See id. Merely stating that the ordinance was "clear" does establish that plaintiffs' 
claims were frivolous. The decision and order granting sanctions contains no discussion 
or analysis of plaintiff s position or argument. 
The trial court does not discuss the fact that plaintiffs sought and were granted 
declaratory relief. While stating that plaintiffs' proposed interpretation was "wrong," the 
trial court does not support a determination that plaintiffs' proposed interpretation was 
frivolous and had no basis in law or in fact. 
ii) Bad Faith 
A finding that plaintiffs' action was frivolous and/or lacked merit does not create a 
presumption that the action was brought in bad faith, an additional and separate element 
for an attorney fee award under the statute. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 
46, ]f 10, 22 P.3d 556. A frivolous action having no basis in law or fact is "without 
merit," for attorney's fee purposes, but it is nevertheless "in good faith" as long as there is 
an honest belief that it is appropriate and as long as there is no intent to hinder, delay, 
defraud, or take advantage of the other pairty. Bover v. Boyer. 2008 UT App 138, | 24; 
183 P.3d 1068. see Cady v.Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
. . . the mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily 
mean that the action is also brought in bad faith. See Utah Depft of Soc. 
Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1198 n. 6 (Ut. Ct.App.1991). Such an 
interpretation would conflate the two prongs required under the statute. 
Thus, it does not follow that simply because the [plaintiff] had no legal 
foundation to bring the action that it was also acting in bad faith. Rather, a 
finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective 
intent. Pennington. 973 P.2d at 939 n. 3. We recognized as much when 
refusing to grant attorney fees in Cady... .671 P.2d at 151-52. We stated, 
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Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and better 
preparation might well have disclosed that to them. However, 
that conduct does not rise to lack of good faith. The evidence 
must also affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of the 
three elements of good faith heretofore discussed. There was 
no evidence that plaintiffs lacked an honest (although ill-
formed) belief in their claim . . . 
Id at 152. 
In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^  49, 86 P.3d 712. 
The mere fact that the court below declined to adopt plaintiffs' proposed 
interpretation of the city ordinances does not establish bad faith. None of the facts found 
by the trial court establish bad faith under Cadv v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court must conclude separately and distinctly, from a determination that 
the action was "without merit" that a party's subjective intent and must find that the party 
lacked good faith. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ^ j 11, 
186 P.3d 1012; Still Standing Stable. LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, f 9, 122 P.3d 556. 
A finding of bad faith turns on a specific factual determination of a party's 
subjective belief and intent. Still Standing at If 9; Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. 
Cannon. 2002 UT 99, | 23, 61 P.3d 1009, rehearing denied; Raile Family Trust ex rel 
Raile v. Promax Dev. Corp.. 2001 UT 40, \ 14, n.2; 24 P.3d 980. 
No facts supports a finding of bad faith on the part oft plaintiffs. 
iii) Lack of Merit" and "Bad Faith" are Distinct and Separate Elements 
Issues of merit and bad faith should not be mixed and conflated in determining 
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whether award of attorney fees is available under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as 
amended). Gallegos v. Llovd. 2008 UT App 40, f 22, 178 P.3d 922, cert, denied 189 
P.3d 1276; Still Standing at 111. 
While an action "must be meritless to award attorney fees under section 
78-27-56, the mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily mean 
that the action is also brought in bad faith." [In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 
86 P.3d 712] at \ 49 {citing Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
1193, 1198 n. 6 (Ut. Ct.App.1991)). "[A] finding of bad faith turns on a 
factual determination of a partyfs subjective intent." IcL_ (citing Pennington 
v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998)). 
Still Standing at % 9. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
. . . although "[p]laintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and 
better preparation might well have disclosed that to them . . . that conduct 
does not rise to lack of good faith." 
Still Standing at If 15 quoting Cady, 671 P.2d at 152. 
"To establish a lack of good faith, or 'bad faith' under section 78-27-56, a 
party must prove that one or more of these factors is lacking." [In re 
Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, ^  48]; see also Chipman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158, 
1163 (Ut. Ct.App.1997) (reversing an order awarding attorney fees where 
the trial court neither stated which of the bad faith factors applied nor 
discussed any evidence supporting any factor). Thus, again, without such 
further proof, lack of legal merit is insufficient for an attorney fee award 
under this section. 
Still Standing at 112, 122 P.3d 556. 
Before the . . . the prevailing parties[] may recover attorney fees 
under section 78-27-56, the trial court must make a factual finding that the 
[other party] asserted their [claim or] defense in bad faith. See Cady v. 
Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1983) (explaining that the terms "bad 
faith" and "lack of good faith," for the purposes of section 78-27-56, are 
synonymous). A finding of bad faith must be based on at least one of the 
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following three factors: "(I) The party lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted 
with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others." Valcarce \v. Fitzgerald"!. 961 P.2d [305] at 316 (citing 
Cady,671P.2datl51). 
Gallegos at ^ 15; Still Standing at If 12; Rohan v. Boseman. 2002 UT App 109, f 39, 46 
P.3d 753, rehear denied, cert, denied 59 P.3d 603; Wardley at \ 29; Chipman v. Miller, 
934 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Utah 1997). No evidence in this case supports a finding of any one 
of the factors required to establish bad faith. 
The burden is on the party seeking an award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(1953 as amended) to establish bad faith. The City Defendants have not done so. 
Factor (i): Uncontroverted affidavits establish plaintiffs had an honest belief in the 
propriety of their actions. R. 322-470. They acted with good motivations. Id. No 
evidence shows the sixty-two (62) plaintiffs had any improper intent or purpose. The 
sparse findings the trial court made {supra, pp. 34-37) do not begin to show plaintiffs 
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question." 
Factor (ii): There is no evidence that plaintiffs "intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of others." Rule 11. No evidence shows plaintiffs acted in an unconscionable 
manner or for an unconscionable purpose. Plaintiffs merely sought an interpretation and, 
if appropriate, application of Ogden City election ordinance^. 
Factor (iii): No evidence indicates plaintiffs "intended to or acted with the 
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others." Rule 
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11. Nothing suggests dilatory tactics or other efforts calculated to harass the opposing 
party and/or drive up litigation costs. 
The factual findings made by the trial court, even if they were true, do not tend to 
show, much less prove, any one of the factors required to establish bad faith. Supra, pp. 
34-37. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants did not comply with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants' "warning letter" was not a motion made and served as Rule 11 
requires. Plaintiffs were not afforded the mandatory safe harbor. Plaintiffs' counsel was 
served with a Rule 11 motion over five (5+) months after the oral dismissal of the 
complaint. Rule 11 motions filed after a dismissal of the underlying case must be denied. 
Granting sanctions without compliance with the provisions of Rule 11 constitutes a denial 
of due process. 
The trial court based its award of fees under Rule 11 upon its earlier erroneous 
award under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The earlier mistaken award 
could not validly support the later Rule 11 award. 
No facts support the Rule 11 sand ions. No findings of fact made by the trial court 
support the Rule 11 sanctions. 
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Findings of fact are required to support the fee awards under Ut. Code Ann. § 78-
27-56 (1953 as amended). Contrary to this requirement, the court below failed to make 
independent findings or made such findings based on insufficient facts. 
This action was brought in good faith under Utah Declaratory Judgment Act and 
sought the exact relief provided by that statute. Thus, plaintiffs should not have been 
assessed attorney fees even though the trial court rejected plaintiffs' proposed interpre-
tation of the ordinances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953 as amended) authorizes an award of attorney 
fees only upon a finding that the suit (a) was frivolous and (ti) was not brought in good 
faith. In this case, both elements are lacking. First, plaintiffs reasonably argued 
defendants' interpretation of the relevant sections of Ogden City election code is legally 
flawed because it renders the ordinance useless. Second, defendants fail to meet their 
burden to show that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad faith. Plaintiffs' affidavits 
establish that they acted in the public interest and in good faith. None of the three 
elements to establish a lack of good faith are present in this case. 
The trial court did not allow plaintiffs to respond to tlie motion for attorney fees 
precipitously hearing and granting that motion over the objections of plaintiffs' counsel. 
That earlier ruling entered without due process can not support the Rule 11 sanctions 
which are the subject matter of this appeal. 
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RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the decision below imposing sanctions under Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure should be reversed and the Court should enter an order denying 
the Rule 11 motion as a matter of law. 
Appellant should be awarded his costs and fees incurred below and in this 
appeal.21 
DATED this 22nd day of DECEMBER 2008. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Appellant 
21
 As the "prevailing party" in successfully opposing the Rule 11 motion, appellant 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Rule 11(c)(1)(A), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 
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UT. CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825. ATTORNEY FEES-AWARD WHERE ACTION 
OR DEFENSE IN BAD FAITH-EXCEPTIONS (FORMERLY § 78-27-56) 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
i 
RULE ll(b)-(c). SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND 
OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANCTIONS 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper 
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
©) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court deter-
mines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct 
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but 
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service 
of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged 
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing 
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or 
opposing the motion. . . . 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing 
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision 
(b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule 
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or 
n 
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a 
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion 
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant 
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation. 
# * * 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless 
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement 
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be 
sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed. 
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EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF OCTOBER 23, 2007. 
BEFORE THE HON. PARLEY BALDWIN, JUDGE 
TRANSCRIPT, R. 802 ETSEQ. 
Attorney Fees Motion (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-27-59 (1953 as amended)) 
Heard & Decided Without Notice or Opportunity to Respond 
Mr. Barnard: If I may, Your Honor. My understanding is that the 
attorneys' fees motion is not before the Court today. It's not in the notice 
that I received from the Court, and I've not responded to their motion for 
attorneys' fees. I don't believe - 1 don't understand that it's properly before 
the court today. (Transcript, 19:18-23) 
Mr. Preston: Well, Your Honor, we had asked - and we understood that 
all - all motions were going to be heard at the same time. We had - this 
motion - we filed a motion for expedited briefing and this was included. 
We informed the clerk that we wanted all motions heard at the same time. I 
think it's - the Court can hear argument on it now at this point. (Transcript, 
19:25 - 20:6) 
The Court: You may proceed. (Transcript, 20:7) 
Mr. Barnard: As I indicated, Your Honor, I've not responded to, and am 
not prepared to deal with, the issue of the attorneys' fees. Although a 
request was made to Your Honor to expedite this briefing, that wasn't 
granted. Although there was a request to file an over length memo in this 
case regarding attorneys' fees, that hasn't been granted. Mr. Preston makes 
mention of a reply memo that he's argued from today which I've not seen 
and I've not received from him. (Transcript, 23:24 - 24:7) 
IV 
Complaint Sought Declaratory Relief 
The Court: The plaintiff seeks the following relief in their prayer in the 
complaint. One, that a declaration that Godfrey is in violation of municipal 
code 1-8-2A and C in that he has solicited, received, and spent campaign 
contributions personally without having registered a personal campaign 
committee with the city recorder's. (Transcript, 31:3-£) 
* * * 
The Court: Part of the prayer for relief, point two, is a declaration that 
Godfrey is in violation of municipal code 1-8-2D in that he has not 
registered his personal campaign committee, People to Re-elect Matthew 
Godfrey, with the recorder. (Transcript, 31:15-19) 
The Court: The plaintiffs ask for a declaration that Godfrey is in violation 
of Ogden municipal code 1-8-4B in that his personal campaign committee, 
People to Re-elect Matthew Godfrey, has not filed the required financial 
disclosures with the Ogden City Recorder. (Transcript, 32:20-24) 
Ruling from the Bench :: 
Basis for Determination under Ut. Code Ann. §78-27-59 (1953 as amended) 
The Court: Now let me go a step further. It is not my intent as a member 
of the judiciary to place any kind of a chilling effect 6n members of the 
public who are seeking redress from - from public officials or others. But 
there is - in my mind always should be some consequence for taking the 
actions that litigants want to take. 
The - there is a section - it is 78-27-59. It talks about attorney fees 
and awards where actions or defenses in bad faith and exceptions. This 
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requires that in civil actions the Court shall, shall award attorneys' fees to 
prevailing party if the Court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and brought or asserted in good faith, and then 
there are some exceptions to that. 
That is a two-prong requirement. One, in order for me to award 
attorneys' fees, I must find that the action was brought without merit and 
then determine whether or not it was brought - it must be brought or 
asserted in good faith. (Transcript, 35:3-20) 
The Court: As I have had a chance to review this particular case and the 
law, first of all, I'm making a determination that this case was brought 
without merit. As I've stated maybe a couple of times before, 1 think that 
it-that the ordinance that's involved is - is very simple. 
Now the question that I'm required to look at is whether or not it was 
asserted in good faith. Unlike a lot of cases before this was brought it was 
investigated, first of all, by the city attorney who issued a memorandum that 
I have had a chance to review setting forth the law after a request by the 
recorder's office to do that. I've had a chance to review that - that 
document. (Transcript, 35:25 - 36:11) 
The Court: I have read with interest the discussion that the city attorney's 
- city attorney had in that memorandum that has been submitted. I think 
that that in itself would put those who were in a position to bring this 
lawsuit on notice. 
In addition, I am perplexed that this action brought by the public, and 
Mr. Barnard referred - referred to this, that - that maybe given time all of 
the candidates would be brought in. They weren't, and this action - it 
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would have compelled me to take everyone off of the - off of the ballot. 
This was directed specifically at this candidate. And taking that in 
mind, the nature of the bringing of this action against this particular 
defendant and the other defendants, the timing of it, tfyis Court finds that it 
was brought in bad faith. 
Mr. Barnard, I want to give you an ample opportunity to respond to 
attorneys' fees. I'll ask that the parties submit those to me, and I'll review 
them. And, again, once I make the finding, the Court is required to make a 
reasonable attorneys' fees, but then it gives me some discretion, and you 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. 
BRILEY, et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City 
Recorder; GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden 
City Attorney; and, MATTHEW 
GODFREY, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 070905792 WR 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin 
FEB 2 9 MB 
FILED 
FEB 2 9 2008 
SFOOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
At the hearing in this matter held on October 23, 2007, the Court granted the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. This Court also found 
that the plaintiffs' complaint was frivolous and had been filed in bad faith. This Court 
allowed the defendants to file Attorney's Fee Affidavits and allowed the Plaintiffs to respond 
to the affidavits. The defendants, Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, filed their Attorney's 
Fee Affidavit of Stanley J. Preston which set forth the attorney's fee and cost incurred by 
them. Defendant, Matthew Godfrey, filed an Attorney's Fee Affidavit of Robert A. Echard 
which sets forth the attorney's fee incurred by him. Plaintiffs filed their Response and 
Opposition to Defendants's Motion for Attorney's Fees and alsq filed a series of affidavits 
from counsel, Brian Barnard, lead plaintiff Dorothy Littrell (as she was referred to by her 
Memorandum Decision 
counsel), and other individual nlaintiffs. 
i •nil iiiii urn 
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In the Ogden City Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response and Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Fees, they refer to two newspaper articles from the Standard 
Examiner, one dated October 4, 2007, and another dated October 24, 2007. Plaintiffs have 
made a motion to strike Exhibit A of the Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Response and 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Exhibit One of Defendants' Consolidated 
Memorandum. The Court grants the Motion To Strike Newspaper Articles and does not 
consider them in the ruling on attorney fees and costs. 
Plaintiffs argue that the court should not award any fees because their complaint had 
merit, was not frivolous, and was not filed in bad faith. The Court has already rejected 
plaintiffs' interpretation of the City ordinance and their position in the litigation and has 
already determined that plaintiffs' lawsuit was brought without merit and in bad faith. The 
only issue remaining before this Court is the amount of attorney's fees and costs, if any, to 
be awarded to the defendants. 
Other than the affidavit of the lead plaintiff, Dorothy E. Littrell, Plaintiffs counsel 
filed 20 affidavits that are all essentially identical and are merely a boiler plate production. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 provides that the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a 
prevailing party after the court determines that the action was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith unless the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. Rather 
than address the present issues, the affidavit essentially restates conclusions that are totally 
inconsistent with the prior rulings of this court. 
Littrell v Mansell 
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This lawsuit was not about interpreting an ordinance and having all the candidates 
removed from the ballot because of their failure to make disclosures. It was an attempt to 
discredit and remove Matthew Godfrey as a candidate for mayc r^. 
Plaintiffs argue that an award of attorney's fees will have a chilling effect on future 
plaintiffs seeking judicial assistance to interpret city ordinances. The public should exercise 
the rights 10 seek redress from the courts on important issues fro^n all forms of government. 
Thejudicial system should not be used for political and vindictive purposes andplaintiffs and 
their attorneys have a duty to make sure that a lawsuit has merit and is brought in good faith. 
Filing frivolous non-meritorious lawsuits targeting a person running for a public office 
should be chilled. The legislature in Utah has determined by the passage of Utah Code Ann. 
78-27-56 that a method of chilling those cases brought in bad faith and without merit is by 
awarding attorney's fees. 
The challenge in this case is a group of plaintiffs who have been recruited to 
participate in this lawsuit who are now facing participation in a judgment for substantial 
attorney fees. Approximately one-third of those plaintiffs have Signed an identical affidavit 
informing the court that they had the exact same feeling about filing the lawsuit, went 
through the exact same process of reviewing the ordinance, and reached exactly the same 
conclusions. None of the twenty plaintiffs who signed identical affidavits apparently 
reviewed the memorandum prepared by their City Attorney wblich put them on notice that 
their position was flawed. None have informed the court that their counsel reviewed the 
memorandum of the City Attorney or were given the opportunity to correct their 
Littrell v Mansell 
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misunderstanding of the plain language of the ordinance prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
Not one of the twenty plaintiffs informed the court by way of affidavit that their attorney had 
been put on notice that the Defendants would be seeking attorney fees if the lawsuit was not 
voluntarily withdrawn and decided to proceed not withstanding the risk of substantial award 
of attorneys fees. 
This Court does not believe that the vast majority of the plaintiffs in this case had any 
idea of the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith action. Nevertheless, 
they must now take some responsibility for the expenses that have been born by the 
defendants. The Court grants judgment against the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendant, 
Ogden City, Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams in the amount of $14,448.67 and in favor of 
the defendant, Matthew Godfrey, in the amount of $718.75. 
This result does not preclude the parties from requesting sanctions under Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
Attorneys for the Defendants shall prepare the appropriate order. 
DATED this 3tf ^ a y of February, 2008. 
Parlev R. Baldwin J y .  
District Court Judge 
Littrell v Mansell 
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CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; GARY 
WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and 
MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 23, 2007, in connection with 
plaintiffs' Complaint Seeking Extraordinary Writ, plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction 
and Extraordinary Writ, defendants' Motions to Dismiss and defendant Mansell and Williams' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. At this hearing, a number of plaintiffs were present and 
plaintiffs were represented by their attorney Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal Clinic. 
Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams were present and represented by their attorneys 
Stanley J. Preston and D. Jason Hawkins of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
Defendant Matthew Godfrey was also present and represented by his attorney Robert A. Echard 
of the law firm of Robert Echard & Associates, PC. 
At the conclusion of the October 23, 2007 hearing, the Court denied plaintiffs' Motion for 
Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, granted defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and 
granted defendants Mansell and Williams* Motion for Attorneys1 Fees and Costs. The Court 
reserved on ruling on that amount of fees and costs to be awarded to defendants, instructed 
counsel for the defendants to prepare and file attorney's fee affidavits, and informed plaintiffs 
that they had the right to respond/object to these affidavits. 
On or about November 16, 2007, defendants Mansell and Williams filed the Attorney's 
Fee Affidavit of Stanley J. Preston, seeking fees and costs incurredlas of October 31, 2007, in the 
amount of $28,914.21. Plaintiffs filed a response wherein they objected to the fee affidavit. In 
response, defendants Mansell and Williams conceded that there was one minor clerical mistake 
in the amount of 516.87, reducing the actual amount of fees and costs incurred to $28,897.34. 
On or about December 20, 2007, defendant Matthew Godfrey filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees 
with a supporting affidavit in the amount of $1,437.50. Plaintiffs filed a response wherein they 
objected to that fee affidavit. 
During the course of briefing the issue of attorney's fees and costs, defendants Mansell 
and Williams referred the Court to two newspaper articles from th^ Standard Examiner. On or 
about December 28, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles. 
On February 29, 2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision in this matter, wherein 
it awarded defendants Mansell and Williams attorneys fees and coqts in the amount of 
314,448.67, awarded defendant Godfrey attorneys fees and costs in the amount of S718.75, 
granted plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles, and instructed defendants to prepare an 
appropriate order. 
Accordingly, based upon the extensive memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
parties, together with the exhibits thereto, as well as the arguments presented during the October 
23. 2007 hearing, and being fully informed in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ is DENIED, 
Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Complaint herein is 
hereby dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the merits, based on the following grounds: 
a. Mayor Godfrey established a personal campaign committee ("PCC"), 
which was named "People to Re-Elect Matthew Godfrey," as was required by Ogden 
Municipal Code § 1-8-2A and C. 
b. Mayor Godfrey registered his PCC with the City Recorder as required by 
Subsection 1-8-2D of the Ogden Municipal Code. The registration form that Mayor 
Godfrey filed with the City Recorder was prepared and provided by die City and satisfied 
the minimal requirements of Subsection 1-8-2D. It was (1) "a written statement," (2) 
"signed by the candidate," (3) "'setting forth that the candidate's personal campaign 
committee has been appointed or elected," and (4) "giving the name and address of each 
member and the secretary of the committee." Ogden Municipal Code § 1-8-2D. The 
ordinance does not require that the name of the candidate's PCC be listed on the 
registration form. 
c. Mayor Godfrey filed the necessary financial statements with the City 
Recorder as required by Section 1-8-4 of the Ogden Municipal Code. That filing was 
made in a timely manner on forms prepared and provided by the City, and complied with 
the requirements of Section 1-8-4. Mayor Godfrey was not required to provide the name 
of his PCC on his financial statements. Rather Section 1-8-4B states that the financial 
statement 4iall be tiled by the "candidate or political campaign committee." 
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d. Contrary to plaintiffs' position, the ordinance did not require that 
registration and financial statements set forth the specific nafrie of the candidate's PCC. 
Rather, the ordinance is very clear and simple and places the responsibility to make such 
filings on the candidate. 
2. Defendants' respective Motions for Attorney's Fees and Costs are GRANTED, 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendants Mansell and Williams are hereby 
awarded judgment against plaintiffs in the amount of $14,448.67, and defendant Godfrey is 
hereby awarded judgment against plaintiffs in the amount of $718.75, based on the following 
grounds: 
a. The Court does not desire to chill members 6f the public from exercising 
their constitutional rights to seek redress from the courts. However, there are 
consequences for bringing a meritless lawsuit in bad faith. 
b. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 provides that "the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith/' 
(Emphasis added). 
c. Based on the Court's rulings, the defendants were the prevailing parties in 
this case.. 
d. The Conn specifically determined that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was without 
merit. This determination was based upon the fact that the ordinance in question is 
simple and clear, and plaintiffs* position is entirely unsupported by the plain language of 
the ordinance and in direct conflict with Utah statutory construction law. Stated 
differently, plaintiffs* lawsuit was frivolous and had no basis in law or fact. 
e. The Court further determined that plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in bad 
faith. Unlike many cases, plaintiffs' claims were reviewed, analyzed and appropriately 
rejected by the Ogden City Attorney before this lawsuit was filed. The Court reviewed 
the City Attorney's memorandum addressing plaintiff Dorothy Littrell's complaints and 
found the memorandum to be accurate and on point. The City Attorney's memorandum 
put plaintiffs on notice that their position lacked any merit. Additionally, the timing of 
plaintiffs' lawsuit (filed just weeks before the general election) and the fact that plaintiffs 
targeted only Mayor Godfrey in their lawsuit (even though he used the same forms as 
every other candidate and no other candidate listed the name of their PCC on their 
registration and financial statements) further demonstrate that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit 
in bad faith and in an effort to improperly influence the outcome of the election. These 
facts ail establish that (1) plaintiffs lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their 
actions; (2) plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defendants 
through their actions; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to improperly influence the outcome 
of the mayoral election through their actions. 
f. The amount of fees and costs awarded herein are more than reasonable 
considering that the awards represent only one half (1/2) of the amounts requested in 
defendants' affidavits. The Court could have awarded the full amount of fees and costs 
incurred but chose not to because the Coun believes that the majority of the plaintiffs aid 
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not understand the consequences of filing this vindictive, frivolous, bad faith lawsuit 
Nevertheless, they must now take some responsibility for the expenses that have been 
born by the defendants. Plaintiffs are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded 
herein.1 
g. This ruling does not preclude the defendants from requesting additional 
amounts as sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
h. The Court also relies on the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision dated February 29, 2008. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles is G&ANTED. The Court 
granted that motion and did not consider the newspaper articles in ruling on the issue of 
attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of , 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
!Plaintiffs Don K. Wilson. Robert H. Cato, Brook Larsen and Laneil Larsen were 
voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 prior to the October 23. 2Q07 hearing. Therefore, they 
are not liable for the amounts awarded herein under Utah Code Annj § 78-27-56. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
By : 
Robert A. Echard 
Attorneys for Defendant Godfrey 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Stanley J. Preston 
D. Jason Hawkins 
z t^torneys for Defendants Mansell and Williams 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the U_ day of March, 2008,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; 
(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; (3) 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AND 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT; AND (4) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES to be sent via U.S. mail to the following: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic, Inc. 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Robert A. Echard 
2491 Washington Blvd., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Matthew Godfrey 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OE WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. 
BRILEY; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; 
GARY WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; 
and MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judge Parley R. Baljrwin 
Case No. 070905792 
JUN 2 7 2008 
SECOND 
DiSTRlCT COURT 
JtjN 2 72006 
This matter is before the court on three motions: Defendants\ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions; 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portion of 
Reply Memo. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike is denied as moot; Defendants' 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is granted; and Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment 
is granted. 
I. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs ask the court to strike a portion of Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants Mansell and Williams' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. In this Reply, according to 
Plaintiffs, Mansell and Williams argue for the first time that the court may award attorney fees 
pursuant to its inherent power to manage its own affairs. Because this argument was mads for 
the first time in a reply memorandum. Plaintiffs ask the court to strike this portion of Defendants' 
memorandum. Because the court declines to exercise its inherent authority to impose sanctions, 
the court considers the motion moot, Therefore, the motion to strike is denied. 
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II. Defendants' Rule 11 Motion 
Defendants Mansell and Williams filed this motion to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Mr. Barnard, under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(b) states as 
follows: 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court[,] an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; [and] 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). If the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the 
court may, subject to certain conditions, impose an appropriate sanction upon the 
attorney, law firm, or party that has violated subdivision (b). Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c). 
On or about October 1, 2007, Plaintiffs, through Mr. Barnard, filed their 
Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, seeking to have 
Mayor Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the November 2007 election. On or 
about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a letter 
advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued the 
action. Mr. Barnard elected to press forward with the lawsuit. 
On October 23, 2007, the court conducted a hearing in this matter. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, finding that it was 
frivolous and had been filed in bad faith, justifying an award of attorney fees under Utah 
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Code Ann. § 78-27-56. On February 29, 2008, the court issued its Memorandum 
Decision, awarding the Ogden City Defendants attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$14,448.67, and awarding Godfrey attorney fees and costs in the amount of $718.75, The 
Ogden City Defendants now seek to recover the balance of their attorney fees from Mr. 
Barnard under Rule 11. 
The court has already found that this complaint was meritless and was filed in bad 
faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly enforcing the City's election 
ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. It was an attempt to discredit one particular 
candidate in an attempt to influence the upcoming election. This ^ase was an abuse of the 
judicial process, and the court concludes that it was filed for an improper purpose within 
the meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). Because this lawsuit was frivolous and filed in bad faith 
and for an improper purpose, the court concludes that Mr. Barnard has violated 
subdivisions (1) and (2) of Rule 11(b). 
The only issue remaining is the conditions subject to which the court may impose 
a sanction, described in Rule 11(c). Specifically, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides that a motion 
for sanctions under Rule 11 must be served on the violating party 21 days before being 
filed with the court, in order to give the violating party an opportunity to withdraw the 
violating document or otherwise correct the violation. Mr. Barnard contends that a 
formal Rule 11 motion was not served on him until after his complaint had been 
dismissed. Therefore, according to Mr. Barnard, Defendants did qot comply with the safe 
harbor provision of Rule 11, and Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate. 
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Mr. Barnard's argument essentially identifies two potential problems with 
Defendants' Rule 11 Motion. First, Defendants' October 11 letter, warning Plaintiffs that 
Defendants would seek Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiffs pursued the lawsuit, was not a 
formal motion for sanctions, as required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Second, even if this letter 
were considered proper under the rule, the complaint was involuntarily dismissed only 12 
days after the letter was sent, depriving Plaintiffs of the 21-day safe-harbor period 
required by Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 
The purpose of the safe-harbor provision is to alert the violating party that his 
position may be frivolous and that sanctions may be sought against him5 and to give him 
an opportunity to correct the violation. Although Rule 11 technically requires the moving 
party to serve a formal motion on the violating party, the purpose of Rule 11 is 
accomplished just as well by a warning letter, such as the one sent to Plaintiffs' counsel in 
this case, and on this basis, courts have found that such a letter substantially complies 
with the requirements of Rule 11. See, e.g., Niesenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 
804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003); Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Adam Techs., Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 927 (7th 
Cir. 2004). The court concludes that the letter sent to Mr. Barnard on October 11, 2007, 
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). 
As to the 21-day requirement in Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the court notes that Mr. 
Barnard had 12 days to withdraw the complaint before the hearing on October 23. This 
was enough time for Mr. Barnard to consider the possibility of sanctions, and when he 
and his clients proceeded with the hearing, they effectively rejected the warning. See id. 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 070905792 
Page 5 of 7 
As in the Methode case, Defendants here "did what they could to comply with Rule 11" 
but "were prevented by the speed of events from granting a 21 -day period to withdraw the 
allegation." Id. The court also notes that the only reason more time was not allowed to 
pass was because Plaintiffs requested an expedited hearing, at which the complaint was 
involuntarily dismissed. Mr. Barnard can not now use the expedited timetable that he 
requested as a shield against Rule 11 sanctions. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
court concludes that Defendants substantially complied with Rule 11 and that sanctions 
are appropriate. The court, therefore, imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of 
$10,000, payable to Defendants Mansell and Williams. 
III. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment 
Plaintiffs filed this motion after sending payment to Defendants for the previous award of 
attorney fees. Defendants Mansell and Williams opposed the motion on the grounds that a final 
judgment had not yet been entered, and Defendants felt it premature to deposit Plaintiffs' checks 
at that time. An order was signed by the court on April 4, 2007, and filed on April 8, 2007, 
granting the motion for attorney fees and awarding judgment of $14,448.67 against Plaintiffs, in 
favor of Mansell and Williams. Apparently Defendants had not yet received a copy of this order 
at the time they filed their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion. Because a final judgment has now 
been entered, the court determines that the Defendants' opposition is moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs' 
motion is granted. 
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Counsel for Defendants Mansell and Williams is directed to prepare, circulate, and 
submit an order consistent with this decision for the court's signature. 
DATED this <3C> day of June, 2008. 
kticti^ . 
Parley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
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CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; GARY 
WILLIAMS, Ogden City Attorney; and 
MATTHEW GODFREY, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on three separate motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo; and (3) Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment.1 
Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
Defendants, Mansell and Williams (the "Ogden City Defendants") filed this motion to 
impose sanctions on Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Brian M. Barnard, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. On or about October 1, 2007, Plaintiffs through their attorney, Mr. 
Barnard, filed their Complaint and Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ, seeking 
to have Mayor Godfrey's name removed from the ballot in the November 2007 mayoral election. 
On or about October 11, 2007, counsel for the Ogden City Defendants sent Mr. Barnard a usafe 
!The Court issued a Memorandum Decision dated June 27, 2008, wherein it granted the 
Ogden City Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions and Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction 
of Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo. The Court adopts 
and incorporates its Memorandum Decision as if fully set forth herein. 
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harbor" letter advising him that they intended to seek Rule 11 sanctions against him if he pursued 
the matter. Mr. Barnard elected to press forward with the lawsuit. 
On October 23,2007, the Court conducted a hearing in this matter. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint, finding that it was frivolous and had been filed 
in bad faith, justifying an award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. On 
February 29, 2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision, awarding the Ogden City 
Defendants attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $14,448.67, and awarding Defendant Godfrey 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $718.75. On April 8, 2008, the Court entered its Order: 
Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; Granting Defendants' Motions for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs; Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ; and Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Newspaper Articles.2 
On March 31, 2008, the Ogden City Defendants filed their Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
seeking to recover the balance of their attorney's fees from Mr. Barnard as sanctions under Rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court previously determined that the Complaint in this 
case was meritless and was filed in bad faith. This lawsuit was not about interpreting and fairly 
enforcing the Ogden City election ordinances as to all mayoral candidates. Rather, it was an attempt 
to discredit one particular candidate in an attempt to improperly influence the outcome of the 
mayoral election. This case was an abuse of the judicial process and it was filed for an improper 
purpose. For the reasons set forth in the Ogden City Defendants' memoranda and the Court's 
2The Court adopts and incorporates its February 29, 2008 Memorandum Decision and 
April 8, 2008 Order as if fully set forth herein. 
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June 27,2008 Memorandum Decision, the Court grants the Ogden City Defendants' Motion for Rule 
11 Sanctions. The Court imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of $10,000, payable to 
Defendants Mansell and Williams. The Court finds this amount to be fair and reasonable in light 
of the fact that it is only a portion of the fees and costs that the Ogden City Defendants reasonably 
incurred in their effort to defend against this frivolous lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Ogden City Defendants' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. According to Plaintiffs, the 
Ogden City Defendants argue for the first time in their reply memorandum that the Court may award 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to its broad inherent power to manage its own affairs. Because 
this argument was made for the first time in a reply memorandum, Plaintiffs ask the Court to strike 
this portion of the Ogden City Defendants' memorandum. Nevertheless, because the Court relied 
solely upon Rule 11 to impose sanctions against Mr. Barnard, the Court considers the Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo is denied. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment 
Plaintiffs filed this motion after sending payment to the Defendants for the previous award 
of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Ogden City Defendants 
opposed the motion on the grounds that a final order had not yet been entered, and they felt it was 
premature to deposit Plaintiffs' checks at that time. Because a final order has now been entered with 
respect to this previous award of attorney's fees and costs, the Court determines that the Ogden City 
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Defendants' opposition is moot. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is 
granted. 
Accordingly, based upon the extensive memoranda submitted by the parties, together with 
the exhibits thereto, as well as the arguments presented during the October 23,2007 hearing, together 
with the Court's prior ralings in this matter, and being fully infibrmed in the premises, and good 
cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Ogden City Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is GRANTED. The Court 
imposes a sanction on Mr. Barnard in the amount of $10,000, payable to Defendants Mansell and 
Williams. The Court finds this amount to be fair and reasonable in light of the fact that it is only a 
portion of the fees and costs that the Ogden City Defendants reasonably incurred in their effort to 
defend against this frivolous lawsuit. 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Reply Memo is DENIED. The Court did not 
rely on its broad inherent power to impose Rule 11 Sanctions. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is GRANTED. The Court orders 
the clerk to enter the Satisfaction of Judgment satisfying the judgment previously entered against the 
Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
DATED t h i ^ f d a y of U1/ / 1 , 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
=^ V Stanley!. Preston, Attorney 
D. Jason Hawkins, Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants Mansell and 
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3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of Judgment is GRANTED. The Court orders 
the clerk to enter the Satisfaction of Judgment satisfying the judgment previously entered against the 
Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
lis DATED this-; , 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
District Court Judge 
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901232.wpd 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20080752 
DOROTHY E LITTRELL vs. CINDI MANSELjL 
CASE NUMBER 0709057 92 Writs 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - DOROTHY E LITTRELL 
Represented by: BRIAN M BARNARD 
Plaintiff - JAMES R BRILEY . 
Plaintiff - BROOK LARSEN - DISMISSED 
Plaintiff - KATIE SPENDLOVE 
Plaintiff - JASON RUSCH 
Plaintiff - DAVID L RUSCH 
Plaintiff - CYNTHIA RUSCH 
Plaintiff - LANEIL LARSEN - DISMISSED 
Plaintiff - LAVERE W RAWLINS 
Plaintiff - F CRAIG HAZEN 
Plaintiff - PEDRO SR HERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - JOHN HERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - JACKIE WATKINS 
Plaintiff - HERLINDA HERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - PHILLIP FERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - FELICIA FERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - REBECCA P HERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - MELINDA FERNANDEZ NIX 
Plaintiff - RAMON AGUILAR 
Printed: 11/29/08 16:42:47 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 070905792 Writs 
Plaintiff - VIVIAN M CLAY 
Plaintiff - SHERRY GALLEGOS 
Plaintiff - EDDIE J GALLEGOS 
Plaintiff - AFTON L HOSKINS 
Plaintiff - SAMUEL FERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - RAYMOND D ANDERSON 
Plaintiff - MIKE GALBRAITH 
Plaintiff - ROBERT D BLAIR 
Plaintiff - STEVEN L ZAMPEDRI 
Plaintiff - THOMAS MAXOKO 
Plaintiff - HELEN DELGADO 
Plaintiff - DONNA L MARTI 
Plaintiff - EVO MARTI 
Petitioner - DONALD C MARSING 
Plaintiff - SENORINA D FERNANDEZ 
Plaintiff - EPIFANO GALLEGOS 
Plaintiff - ISHELLE EASTMAN 
Plaintiff - GABRIEL MARTINEZ 
Defendant - CINDI MANSELL 
Represented by: STANLEY J PRESTON 
Represented by: D JASON HAWKINS 
Defendant - GARY WILLIAMS 
Represented by: STANLEY J PRESTON 
Represented by: D JASON HAWKINS 
Defendant - MATTHEW GODFREY 
Represented by: ROBERT A ECHARD 
Plaintiff - RULON YORGASON 
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Plaintiff - CHARLES L MAGRUDER 
Plaintiff - LILY MAGRUDER 
Plaintiff - CRISTINA H RODRIGUEZ 
Plaintiff - SAUL R AGUILAR 
Plaintiff - MILTON RODRIGUEZ 
Plaintiff - BASIL BEECH 
Plaintiff - SHARON BEECH 
Plaintiff - DON K WILSON - DISMISSED 
Plaintiff - DAVID THOMPSON 
Plaintiff - JEREMY KILGORE 
Plaintiff - AMANDA KILGORE 
Plaintiff - NANCI BYERS 
Plaintiff - KEITH TISHER 
Plaintiff - ROBERT H CATO - DISMISSED 
Plaintiff - THOMAS I DOLPH 
Plaintiff - LILLIAN MEDINA 
Plaintiff - ART FRAGO 
Plaintiff - DINA FRAGA 
Plaintiff - DAWN FRAGA 
Plaintiff - LINDA FRAGA 
Plaintiff - ZACK B BLAIRO 
Plaintiff - RONNIE HALES 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 5 98.63 
Amount Paid: 5 98.63 
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Credit: 
Balance: 




TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Trust Balance Due: 
Balance Payable: 





















































REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 1.47 
Amount Paid: 1.4 7 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
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Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 3.00 
Amount Paid: 3.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 1.4 7 
Amount Paid: 1.4 7 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 205.00 
Amount Paid: 205.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL TYPE: REPORTER FEES 
Original Amount Due: 











Oct 07, 2008 
Transfer. 
Amount Reason 
-11.31 Adjustment down due to Account 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appealb 
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Page 5 
B a l a n c e : 3 0 0 . 0 0 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: A p p e a l s 
P o s t e d By: UTAH LEGAL CLINIC FOUNDATION 
P o s t e d : 5 O 0 . 0 0 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Refunded: 0.00 
B a l a n c e : 5 0 0 . 0 0 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description: Other Trust 
Recipient: UTAH LEGAL CLINC FOUNDATION IN 
Amount Due: 11.31 
Paid In: 11.31 















07 Judge W BRENT WEST assigned. 
07 Filed: Complaint Seeking Extraordinary Writ 
07 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
07 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received; 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
155.00 
07 Filed: Complaint 
07 Filed: Affidavit of Dorothy E Littrell 
07 Filed: Motion for Immediate Injunction and Extraordinary Writ 
Filed by: LITTRELL, DOROTHY E 
07 Filed: Request for Immediate Hearing 
07 Note: Bonnie gave file to Pam to set hearing 
07 Fee Account created Total Due: 21.00 
07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 21.. 00 
07 Filed order: ORDER OF RECUSAL 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed October 05, 2007 
10-09-07 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned. 
10-09-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF ROBERT H CATO 
10-09-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF DON WILSON 
10-10-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 070905792 ID 10134898 
ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 10/23/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84 401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
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Hearing scheduled as to the request for Injunction and 
Extraordinary Writ and the proposed Motion to Dismiss filed by 
defense counsel. 
Oral arguments for the request for an Injunction and Extraordinary 
Writ will be heard along with the Defendant's Prpposed Motion to 
Dismiss. 
10-10-07 ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled on October 23, 2007 at 02:00 PM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
10-10-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 21.50 
10-10-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 21.50 
10-11-07 Filed: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE - ROBERT A ECHARD FOR MAYOR GODFREY 
10-11-07 Filed: Motion TO DISMISS 
Filed by: ECHARD, ROBERT A 
10-11-07 Filed: EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN OVER-LENGTH 
MEMORANDUM 
10-11-07 Filed: Motion FOR EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J 
10-11-07 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION FOR EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
10-11-07 Filed: Motion TO DISMISS (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J 
10-11-07 Filed: Motion FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J 
10-11-07 Filed: CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS1 
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AND EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND IN 
SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FE 
10-11-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CINDI MANSELL 
10-11-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF GARY R WILLIAMS 
10-11-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 16.50 
10-11-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 16.50 
10-12-07 Dismissed party - WILSON, DON K 
10-12-07 Dismissed party - CATO, ROBERT H 
10-19-07 Filed: RULE 41 DISMISSAL OF BROOK LARSEN & LANElL LARSEN 
10-22-07 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
10-22-07 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE OGDEN CITY 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
10-22-07 Dismissed party - LARSEN, BROOK 
10-22-07 Dismissed party - LARSEN, LANEIL 
10-22-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMIS^ 
10-22-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO EXPEDITE 
10-22-07 Filed: NOTICE RE: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR FEES 
10-23-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING ON MOTIONS 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Clerk: debbieg 
PRESENT 
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Plaintiff(s): DOROTHY E LITTRELL 
Defendant(s): MATTHEW GODFREY 
GARY WILLIAMS 
P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : BRIAN M BARNARD 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : ROBERT A ECHARD 
D JASON HAWKINS 
STANLEY J PRESTON 
V i d e o 
Tape Number: 3D102307 Tape Count: 2:00-2:58 
HEARING 
This is time set for hearing on the motions filed before this 
court. Brian Barnard is present representing the plaintiffs. Stan 
Preston and Jason Hawkins are present representing the defendants' 
Gary Williams and Cindi Mansell. 
Robert Echard is present representing the defendant, Matthew 
Godfrey. 
Court finds the defendant, Matthew Godfrey, has complied with the 
city ordiance. Court grants the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice 
filed by the defendants. 
Court finds this case was brought without merit and in bad faith. 
The Court will allow the defendants to file their affidavit of 














































Christensen & Martineau 



















OF BRIAN M. BARNARD 

















CRISTINA R. RODRIGUEZ 
REBECCA P HERNANDEZ 
SAUL AGUILAR 
RAMON AGUILAR 
PLAINTIFF KATIE SPENDLOVE 
BASIL BEECH 
JAMES R BRILEY 
RAYMOND D ANDERSON 
DAVID L. RUSCH 
CYNTHIA RUSCH 
JASON RUSCH 
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11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF LAVERE W. RAWLINS 
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF RULON YORGASON 
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF F CRAIG HAZEN 
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES L MAGRUDER 
11-23-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF SENORINA FERNANDEZ 
12-03-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FILE OVER-LENGTH OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES 
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
12-03-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR FEES 
12-11-07 Filed: ExParte Application for Leave to File an Over-Length 
Memorandum 
12-11-07 Filed: The Ogden City Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Response 
and Opposition to Defendants Motion for Fees 
12-17-07 Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
12-17-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 10J00 
12-17-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 11 47 
12-17-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES 
12-17-07 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 1.47 
12-17-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO FEE AFFIDAVIT OF STAN PRESTON 
12-18-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
12-18-07 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
Note: 20.00 cash tendered. 5 change given. 
12-19-07 Note: Video of 10/23/07 hearing copied and mailed to Jason 
Hawkins. 
12-20-07 Note: FILE TO PRB WITH REQUEST TO SUBMIT 
12-20-07 Filed: Motion FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Filed by: ECHARD, ROBERT A 
12-20-07 Filed: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
12-21-07 Note: Copied CD of October 23, 2007 hearing for Ray Kimber. 
Notified Mr. Kimber CD ready for pickup. Placed in pickup 
basket in clerks' office. 
12-24-07 Filed: THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE 
TO FEE AFFIDAVIT OF STAN PRESTON 
12-28-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
12-28-07 Filed: MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER 
ARTICLES 
12-31-07 Filed: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE OVER-LENGTH OPPOSITION TO 
GODFREY'S MOTION FOR FEES 
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
12-31-07 Filed: PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MATTHEW GODFREY'S 
MOTION FOR FEES 
01-11-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 3.00 
01-11-08 COPY FEE Payment Received: 3.00 
01-11-08 Filed: REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR FEES 
01-11-08 Filed: THE OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
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MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
01-14-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER 
ARTICLES 
01-15-08 Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
01-16-08 Filed: Notice to Submit PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION TO STRIKE NEWSPAPER 
ARTICLES 
01-28-08 Filed: NOTICE TO SUBMIT: MOTION FOR AWARD OF FEES 
01-31-08 Note: NOTICE TO SUBMIT: MOTION FOR AWARD OF FEES TO PRB 
02-22-08 Note: As the notice to submit concerning attorney fees from Bob 
Echard was filed on 1/31/08 and involves the same issue of 
defendant's fees, the under advisement review is continued. 
02-29-08 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed February 29, 2008 
03-05-08 Filed: NOTICE RE: RULE 41 DISMISSALS 
03-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 10.00 
03-10-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.47 
03-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment; 
03-10-08 POSTAGE-COPIES Payment Received: 1.47 
03-11-08 Note: Video of 10/23/07 hearing copied and mailed to Jason 
Hawkins. 
03-17-08 Filed: NOTICE OF TENDER 
03-31-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND WILLIAMS 
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
03-31-08 Filed: DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND WILLIAMS1 MOTION FOR RULE 11 
SANCTIONS 
Filed by: PRESTON, STANLEY J 
03-31-08 Filed: Motion TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
04-07-08 Note: MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT TO PRB CLERK 
04-07-08 Case Disposition is Judgment 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R BALDWIN 
04-07-08 Case Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition Judge is PARLEY R BALDWIN 
04-08-08 Judgment Entered - Amount $15167.42 
04-08-08 Filed judgment: Order: Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, 
Granting Defendants' Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs, 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Immediate Injunction and 
Extraordinary Writ and Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Newspaper Article 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed April 04, 2008 
04-10-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENTER 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
04-15-08 Filed: RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 11 MOTION 
04-15-08 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN M BARNARD 
04-16-08 Filed: MEMO RE: MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
04-16-08 Filed: Motion TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
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Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
04-16-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
04-16-08 Filed: Notice to Submit MOTION TO ENTER SATISFACTION OF 
JUDGMENT 
04-16-08 Filed: OGDEN CITY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
VACATE JUDGMENT 
04-18-08 Note: HOLD TIL 4-25-08 
04-23-08 Note: File to PRB 
04-23-08 Filed: Notice to Submit MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
04-25-08 Filed order: Order to Set Aside Judgment as to Don Wilson, 
Brook Larsen, Laneil Larsen, and Robert Cato@J 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed April 24, 2008 
04-25-08 Judgment # 1 Modified $ 15167.42 
04-25-08 Judgment # 1 Modified $ 15167.42 
04-25-08 Note: Both Judgments were modified removing Don Wilson, Brook 
Larsen, Laneil Larsen and Robert Cato. 
04-25-08 Filed: REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
04-25-08 Filed: REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MANSELL AND 
WILLIAMS' MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
04-30-08 Filed: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION OF REPLY MEMO 
04-30-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION 
OF REPLY MEMO 
04-30-08 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION AND 
MOTION TO STRIEK PORTIONS OF REPLY MEMO 
05-06-08 Filed: Notice to Submit RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTION OF REPLY MEMO 
05-06-08 Filed: REPLY MEMO RE: OBJECTION TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION 
OF REPLY MEMO 
05-08-08 Note: hold ti. 5-23-08 
05-27-08 Note: Entire file (3 volumes) and Notice to Submit Re: 
Objection to & Motion to Strike Portion of Reply Memo sent to 
PRB. 
06-27-08 Filed order: Memorandum Decision 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed June 26, 2008 
07-11-08 Filed: Request to Court Clerk 
07-11-08 Filed: Satisfaction of Judgment @J 
07-14-08 Judgment #1 Modified $ 15167.42 Disposition: Satisfied 
07-29-08 Note: Rec'd Order: Granting the Ogden City Defendants' Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions; Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 
Portions of Reply Memo: and Granting Plaintiff's Motion to 
Enter Satisfaction of Judgment approved as to form. Sent to PRB 
for signat 
07-31-08 Filed order: Order: Granting the Ogden City Defendants' Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions; Denying Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike 
Portions of Reply Memo and Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter 
Satisfaction of Judgment @J 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
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Signed July 29, 2008 
08-19-08 Filed: NOTICE RE: COST BOND 
08-19-08 Filed: MOTION TO SET SUPERCEDEAS BOND 
Filed by: BARNARD, BRIAN M 
08-19-08 Note: Rec'd Order Setting Supercedeas Bond. Hold until 9/2. 
08-19-08 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
08-19-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
08-19-08 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment; 
08-20-08 Bond Account created Total Due: 205.00 
08-20-08 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
08-20-08 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
08-21-08 Filed: Designation of Record for Appeal 
08-25-08 Note: Rec'd Stipulation and Stipulated Order Setting 
Supercedeas Bond. 
08-27-08 Note: File with Stipulation and Order Setting Supercedeas Bond 
sent to PRB for signature. 
09-04-08 Filed order: STIUPLATED ORDER SETTING SUPERCEDEAS BOND 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed August 28, 2008 
09-04-08 Filed order: STIPULATIN RE: SUPERCEDEAS BOND 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed August 21, 2008 
09-04-08 Filed order: ORDER SETTING SUPERCEDEAS BOND 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed August 28, 2008 
09-04-08 Note: Certified copy of notice of appeal sent to the Supreme 
Court of Utah via interoffice mail. 
09-04-08 Filed: Mailing Certificate 
09-12-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Order 
09-12-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter 
09-16-08 Filed: Notice of Payment Re: Supercedeas Bond 
09-17-08 Bond Account created Total Due: 500.00 
09-17-08 Bond Posted Payment Received: 500.00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
09-18-08 Fee Account created Total Due: 150.00 
09-18-08 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 150..00 
Note: REPORTER FEES, Mail Payment; 
10-01-08 Filed: Transcript of 10-23-07 motion hearing prepared by Diane 
Flanagan. 
10-01-08 Trust Account created Total Due: 11.31 
10-03-08 Filed: Court of Appeals Letter 
10-07-08 REPORTER FEES Transfer Out: -11.31 
Note: Account Transfer From Fee - REPORTER FEES On 
070905792 To Trust - Other Trust On 070905792; Overpayment 
on reporter fees 
10-07-08 Other Trust Transfer In: 11.31 
10-08-08 Note: Appealed: Case #20080752 
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10-09-08 Other Trust Check # 57130 Trust Payout: 11.31 
10-15-08 Note: Record (4 volumes and 1 transcript sent to the Court of 
Appeals via interoffice mail. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY E LITTRELL et al 
Plaintiff, 
vs 




Case No: 070905792 WR 
Judge: fc>ARLEY R BALDWIN 
Date: October 10,2007 
ORAL. ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 10/23/2007 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Oral arguments for the request for an Injunction and Extraordinary-
Writ will be heard along with the Defendant' s Proposed Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Dated this / Q^~day of Q Ck) • , 20 CJ7. 
District!-Court Deputy Clerk 
Case No: 070905792 
Date: Oct 10, 2007 
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic 
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions. 
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.) 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at (801) 395-1071 (five days before 
the hearing, if possible). 
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to 
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names 
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts1 
website at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.htm. 
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to 
print off a copy of this list for you. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call Stella Perea at (801)395-1062 at 
least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY service 
call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) 
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Case No: 070905792 
Date: Oct 10, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070905792 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BRIAN M BARNARD 
Attorney PLA 
214 EAST 5 00 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84111-3204 
Mail ROBERT A ECHARD 
Attorney DEF 
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 
200 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
Mail D JASON HAWKINS 
Attorney DEF 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR 
P 0 BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84145-5000 
Mail STANLEY J PRESTON 
Attorney DEF 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR 
P O BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8-114 5 
Dated this /(T day of Orjr? 2o£T7 • 
Deputy Coti/t Cle m— 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY and THE STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT 
DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. BRILEY; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CINDIMANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; 









Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, by and through counsel, moved this Court 
for an order expediting briefing. 
Defendants moved for an order awarding them attorney fees. Motion, 10/11/2007. 
Plaintiffs' memo in opposition and in response to that motion is due Thursday, October 25, 2007. 
Rule 7, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. There is no reason in law or in fact for expedited briefing or consideration 
of that motion. 
Defendants moved for an order expediting briefing in response to their motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs* response memo has been served ujpon defendants. Defendants' 
motion to expedite briefing with regard to that motion is moot. 
EXHIBIT 
"G" 
As per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs shall shortly file and serve a reply 
memo in further support of their petition and in reply to defendants' opposition memo (dated 
10/11/2007). 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2007. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Petitioners 
o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICp 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed (postage prepaid in the United States 
Postal Service) and fax'ed a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE MEMO RE: 
MOTION TO EXPEDITE to: 
STANLEY J PRESTON 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR 
P.O. Box 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah 84145 
fax: (801) 363-0400 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Robert Echard & Associates, PC 
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
fax: (801) 393-2340 
on the 19th day of OCTOBER 2007. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Petitioners 
i 
o 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY and THE STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT 
DOROTHY E. LITTRELL; JAMES R. BRILEY; et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CINDI MANSELL, Ogden City Recorder; 






MOTION FOR FEES 
Civil No. 
070905792 
Defendants Cindi Mansell and Gary Williams, by and through counsel, moved this Court 
for an order awarding them attorney fees. Motion, 10/11/2007. Plaintiffs' memo in opposition 
and in response to that motion is due Thursday, October 25, 2007.: Rule 7, Ut.R.Civ.Pro. There 
is no reason in law or in fact for expedited briefing or consideration of that motion. 
Plaintiffs shall file a response as per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2007. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Pletitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed (postage prepaid in the United States 
PostaJ Service) and fax'ed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE RE: RESPONSE 
MEMO RE: MOTION FOR FEES to: 
STANLEY J PRESTON 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11TH FLR 
P.O. Box 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah 84145 
fax:(801)363-0400 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Robert Echard & Associates, PC 
2491 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 200 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
on the 19th day of OCTOBER 2007. 
fax: (801) 393-2340 
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Robert R Harrison 
Robert W. Thompson 
Svott H. Martin 
Joseph P. Barrett 
Trystan B. Smith 
Maralyn M. Rc^er 
Kenneth L Reich 
Bradley R. Blackham 
D. Javm Hawkins 
Richard A. Vazquez 
Sam Harkness 
David F. Mull 
Bryan M. Scott 
P Matthew Cox 
Derek J. Williams 
Leilani Marshall 
R. Scon Young 
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Jordan G. Gam 
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU 
A Professional Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
S.ik Lake City-, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone \801) 521-9000 
Facsimile (S01) 3b3-04O0 
\v\v\v.$c miaw. com 
October IK2007 
Brian M. Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic, Inc. 
214 East 500 South 
Salt lake City. Utah 84] 11 
Re: Dorothy Littrell, et al v. Cindi Mamell, et ai 
Case No. 070905792 
Dear Mr. Barnard: 
Thurrmn &. Sutherland 1SS6 
Thurnt \n, Sutherland Sc Km* 1SH8 
Th irnuit, \Veiij(\viMid & Irvine I'Wti 
Irvine, Skeen <?<.Thunr.an W23 
Sk'-cn, rhurmanf \V >rslcv AL Snmv vm 
Wwr%lcv. Snow <Sc Chr.Ntcn>cn 1%7 
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Of Counsel 
Harold G. Chrisren<en 
Joseph Novak 
St. George Office 
37 West 1070 South, #102 
St. GeorgeT Utah 94770 
Telephone (435) 673-8288 
Facsimile (435) 673-1444 
To Contact Writer 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure we hereby provide notice that 
we intend to file a motion for sanctions against you and the Utah Legal Clinic, Inc. The position 
being advocated by your clients in the above-referenced case is npt supported by the relevant 
facts or applicable law, and appears to be aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of the 
upcoming mayoral election. The frivolous nature of the lawsuit ijs demonstrated by the Motion to 
Dismiss, Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and the consolidated supporting memorandum 
that we have filed with the Court, which had to be filed immediately given the expedited relief 
sought by your clients. We will hold off filing a formal Rule 11 ^notion until expiration of the 21 
days safe harbor deadline. If the Complaint has not been voluntarily withdrawn before then, we 
will proceed to file our Rule 11 motion. 
Very truly vours. 
SNOW, CHRIS FF.MSKN & MAR TINEAU 
feston 
SJIVU 
trar\ Williams 
Robert Fchard 
